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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-1-608 (2000), 78-2-2(3)0) (1996), and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether satellite tracking units purchased by Simon and attached to Simon's trucks 
qualify for the sales and use tax exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(36) (2000 & 
Supp. 2001) for "sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by, an authorized 
carrier/' or in other words, whether a partially self-manufactured vehicle should be 
entitled to the exemption to the same extent as a vehicle purchased in one transaction. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This Court reviews the district court's summary judgment ruling for correctness. 
See Surety Underwriters v.E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 340 (Utah 2000). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
"(36) The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this chapter: . . 
. "sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by, an authorized carrier;" 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (2000 & Supp. 2001) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING. 
This is an appeal of the Order of the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, dated June 4, 
2001, granting summary judgment to the Tax Commission in the case of Dick Simon 
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Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, Case no. 990404442. In the Order, Judge 
Burningham ruled that Simon's purchases of satellite unit tracking devices were not 
exempt from Utah sales tax. (The Order, dated June 4, 2001, is attached as Exhibit A. 
Judge Burningham's two rulings preceding the Order are attached as Exhibits B and C.) 
II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
This case arises out of a sales and use tax audit performed by the Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission against Simon for the period April 1, 1993 to 
December 31, 1995, wherein the Division assessed sales tax against Simon's purchases of 
Qualcomm satellite units. Simon believes the satellite units are tax exempt because they 
are one part of Simonfs tax exempt vehicles. Simon thus appealed the audit, and the Tax 
Commission upheld the Division's assessment. (The Commission's decision, which 
involved other issues not part of this appeal, is attached as Exhibit D.) 
Simon appealed the Commission's decision to a tax judge in the district court, 
where both Simon and the Commission filed Motions for Summary Judgment. On 
October 24, 2000, the district court issued a Ruling denying both Motions because the 
court felt there was a fact in dispute as to whether Simon's satellite units were placed on 
exempt vehicles. (The October 24, 2000 Ruling is attached as Exhibit B.) Following this 
Ruling, the Commission filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was granted by the 
district court. On April 20, 2001, after reconsidering its earlier decision, the district court 
granted the Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that the satellite 
units were not exempt. (See Exhibit C.) On June 4, 2001, the Court entered its Order 
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granting Summary Judgment to the Commission. (See Exhibit A.) Simon has now 
appealed the district court's Order to this Court. Simon requests that this Court reverse 
the district court's Order, denying the Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and remanding the case to district court with instructions for the district court to enter a 
ruling in favor of Simon if Simon can prove at trial that its satellite units are as much a 
part of tax exempt vehicles as other necessary parts that make up vehicles. 
III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
1. Simon is a commercial trucking company based in Utah that purchases 
large semi-trucks, and uses them to haul freight throughout North America for other 
companies. See Affidavit of Alban Lang Tf 7, R. at 90. 
2. When Simon receives the partially-completed trucks from the manufacturer, 
the trucks are not legally or practically ready to be placed into service. In order to make 
them ready, Simon does a thorough maintenance check of the trucks, registers and 
licenses the trucks, cures any manufacturing defects in the trucks pursuant to an agency 
agreement with the manufacturer, installs the satellite units, and adds load-locks, trailers, 
company identification and detailing, government required markings, and government 
required safety equipment such as fire extinguishers, mud flaps, and reflective triangles. 
Simon also installs the tires because the manufacturers generally ship the trucks with the 
tires detached. See Affidavit of Alban Lang f^ 8, R. at 89. 
3. The satellite units allow Simon to: 
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a. pinpoint where its trucks are located at all times to provide 
information to customers and to assist Simon in managing its fleet; 
b. help ensure on-time delivery of freight; 
c. accurately track and report fuel and road usage to the Tax 
Commission for fuel and road tax purposes; 
d. provide driving directions to the drivers; and 
e. provide for the safety, convenience and retention of drivers. See 
Affidavit of Alban Lang f 11,R. at 88. 
4. The satellite units are composed of three parts: 
a. a small cylindrical antenna that is attached to the top of the cab of the 
truck; 
b. a keyboard with display that is attached to the dashboard of the 
truck; and 
c. a computer system that is placed behind the driver's seat of the truck. 
See Affidavit of Alban Lang ^ 13, R. at 88. 
5. Simon purchases the satellite units from Qualcomm, Inc. The units are 
generally delivered via common carrier to Simon's Utah facility. See Affidavit of Alban 
Lang f 15, R. at 88. 
6. When Simon's trucks are delivered to Simon's facility from the 
manufacturer, the trucks are all pre-wired and pre-bracketed for the satellite units. See 
Affidavit of Alban Lang t 17, R. at 87. 
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7. Simon's installation of the units consists of bolting the cylindrical antenna 
onto a pre-existing bracket manufactured for these units with four bolts, placing the 
keyboard and computer system onto pre-existing brackets, and plugging the keyboard and 
computer system into pre-existing wires. See Affidavit of Alban Lang ]f 18, R. at 87. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Simon's purchases of satellite units are exempt from sales tax under Utah's 
exemption for interstate "vehicles" because the units are one part of a vehicle. A vehicle 
is nothing more than an aggregation of parts purchased from multiple vendors, and a 
self-manufactured vehicle should be exempt to the same extent as a vehicle purchased in 
one transaction. Importantly, the Legislature has defined the term "vehicle" to include 
self-manufactured vehicles. 
The legislative intent of the vehicle exemption also supports the exemption for the 
satellite units. The exemption was passed in 1995 to encourage trucking companies to 
avoid the gamesmanship that was being engaged in that allowed the purchase of trucks 
sales tax free under the "first use in interstate commerce" test. The legislative intent was 
also to discourage the buying of the trucks out of state that was taking place, and to bring 
those purchases into Utah. If this Court rules that the accessories to trucks are taxable, 
that legislative purpose will be frustrated as the gamesmanship will begin anew and sales 
will be forced outside Utah again as taxpayers lawfully avoid the sales tax. 
The Tax Commission has already made a correct ruling on a similar issue 
involving the legislative exemption for "passenger tramways" (a/k/a ski lifts). The 
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Commission ruled that a "passenger tramway" consists of all the various parts that make 
up the tramway. They thus found that all parts necessary to build the tramway, rather than 
just the cable and chairs, are exempt from sales tax. The Court should follow this Tax 
Commission approach as it relates to vehicles. 
The Court should also reject the notion advanced by the district court that events 
occurring after a sales taxable or exempt transaction are irrelevant in analyzing 
exemptions. This cannot be true because at least ten sales tax exemptions in Utah are 
dependent on facts occurring after the purchase and sale transaction occurs. Rather than 
upholding the district court, this Court should establish a rational and workable tax policy, 
and allow substance to rule over form, by holding that a self-manufactured vehicle is 
exempt to the same extent as a vehicle purchased in a single transaction and therefore all 
parts that make up the complete vehicle are sales tax exempt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Simon's Purchases of Qualcomm Satellite Units Qualify for Utah's Sales and 
Use Tax Exemption for Interstate Vehicles Based on the Plain Language of 
the Statute. 
The issue before the Court is whether the satellite units purchased by Simon and 
attached to Simon's trucks qualify for Utah's sales tax exemption for "sales or leases of 
vehicles to, or use of vehicles by, an authorized carrier.'1 Utah Code Ann. § 
#112096 6 
59-12-104(36) (2000 & Supp. 2001)1 (the "Authorized Carrier Exemption11).2 Appellee 
(the Tax Commission) conceded in its decision in this case that Simon's trucks qualify for 
the exemption (see Commission decision at Exhibit D, pp. 2-3), and that the satellite units 
would be exempt under the Authorized Carrier Exemption if they were attached to the 
trucks at the time Simon purchased the trucks from the manufacturer (see Commission 
decision at Exhibit D, p. 16). The issue in dispute is thus whether the satellite units are 
also exempt if installed on the trucks after the trucks are delivered to Simon from the 
manufacturer, but before the trucks are placed into service. 
Simon's satellite units are sales tax exempt under Utah law because Simon's 
vehicles are exempt and the satellite units are as much a part of the vehicle as are the mud 
flaps. The Authorized Carrier Exemption applies to "sales or leases of vehicles to, or use 
of vehicles by, an authorized carrier." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(36). It is Simon's 
position that this exemption for "vehicles" applies to purchases of all parts of a vehicle 
1
 Because the statutes cited herein have not changed since the audit period, all 
citations are to the most recent version of Utah Code Annotated for ease of reference. 
2
 The Legislature passed the Authorized Carrier Exemption effective July 1, 1995. 
Between April 1, 1993 (the beginning of the audit period), and July 1, 1995, the Tax 
Commission had a rule similar to the Authorized Carrier Exemption that exempted 
purchases of vehicles by authorized carriers. See Utah Admin. R. R865-19-97S, attached 
as Exhibit E. Thus, Simon's purchases from July 1, 1995 through December 31, 1995 fall 
under the statutory exemption, and the purchases from April 1, 1993 through July 1, 1995 
fall under the rule exemption. Appellee (the Tax Commission) agreed in its decision in 
this case that the analysis is the same under either the statutory exemption or the rule 
exemption. (See Commission decision at Exhibit D, p. 13.) Accordingly, Simon will 
address only the statutory exemption here for efficiency. 
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installed prior to the vehicle being placed in service.3 A vehicle is nothing more than an 
aggregation of parts purchased from multiple vendors, and a self-manufactured vehicle 
should be exempt to the same extent as a vehicle purchased in one transaction. Simon 
purchases its vehicles almost fully complete, but installs some accessories, including the 
tires, at its own facility. The fact that Simon installs the accessories rather than the 
manufacturer does not make the accessories any less a part of the 'Vehicle.ff In fact, 
without the tires, and in this day and age, without a satellite unit, Simon cannot operate a 
truck at all. The satellite units are not after thoughts. The trucks are pre-wired and 
pre-bracketed for their easy installation. 
The plain language of the statute supports Simon's position, as the Legislature 
chose simply to use the word "vehicle11 to define the exemption, which indicates any and 
all parts that constitute a vehicle should be exempt. The district court's interpretation, on 
the other hand., requires that the following bracketed words be added to the statute: "sales 
or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by, an authorized carrier, [so long as the vehicle 
is purchased in a single transaction]." The role of courts is to interpret the legislative 
language, not to add to it. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's 
3
 Simon is not arguing herein that replacement parts should be exempt from sales 
tax, only that those parts used to build the truck initially be exempted. The Legislature 
has passed an exemption for replacement parts for airplanes (see Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-104(5), but not for trucks, indicating it does not desire truck replacement parts to 
be exempted. 
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Order, and hold that the district court overstepped its bounds by virtually adding 
restrictive language to the language of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. 
There is no need to add language to the statute, because the Legislature has already 
defined the term ffvehicle,, to include accessories to the vehicle. In the sales tax code, 
"vehicle" is defined as "any vehicle, as defined in Section 41-la-102 . . . that is required 
to be titled registered, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(36) (2000 & Supp. 2001) 
(emphasis added). This definition is central to this case because, under Utah Code Ann. § 
41-la-102(58) (1998 and Supp. 2001), 41-la-201 (1998), and41-la-224 (1998), vehicles 
that are "specially constructed" by someone other than a "generally recognized 
manufacturer" must be titled, registered and licensed. (Emphasis added.) In other words, 
the statutory definition of "vehicle" for purposes of the Authorized Carrier Exemption 
includes vehicles assembled or built by someone other than a standard manufacturer. The 
Legislature has specifically considered whether self-manufactured vehicles are "vehicles," 
and has decided they are. The Legislature has thus declared that under Utah law, a 
vehicle is nothing more than a cumulation of parts. Because the satellite units are part of 
Simon's vehicles, the Court should rule that the units are exempt, and that the district 
court erred in ruling that they are taxable. 
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II. A Wyoming Supreme Court Case is in Agreement with Simon's Position. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court considered this issue and concluded that each 
sub-part of an exempt item should be exempt from sales tax. In 1991, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court considered whether Wyoming could impose sales or use tax on wheel 
parts installed on railroad cars or "rolling stock." See Burlington Northern Railroad Co. 
v. Wyoming State Bd. ofEq., 820 P.2d 993 (Wy 1991). At the time of the case, Wyoming 
had a statutory sales tax exemption for "rolling stock." The majority opinion exempted all 
parts of rolling stock but did not address the statutory exemption. Rather, the majority 
opinion analyzed the case under a constitutional standard, holding that no tax could be 
imposed on the wheel parts because their first "use" was outside Wyoming. Id. The 
concurring opinion, however, did analyze the statutory exemption. The analysis therein, 
authored by Justice Thomas, is helpful to the case at hand. Justice Thomas wrote that, in 
addition to being exempt under the "first use" test, the wheel parts would also be exempt 
under the statutory exemption. He stated: 
I cannot agree with the concept that somehow or other the whole of the 
railroad car is greater than the sum of all of its parts and, in my opinion, the 
several parts of that railroad car cannot avoid being identified as 'rolling 
stock.5 
He also added: 
if Burlington Northern Railroad Company shipped into Wyoming via motor 
carrier all of the component parts of a railroad car and then assembled those 
parts on railroad trackage in Wyoming, the railroad car would be rolling 
stock . . . [and] the express statutory exemption would serve to insulate it 
from use tax." 
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Burlington Northern, 820 P.2d at 996 (concurring opinion of Justice Thomas). 
The wheel parts and railroad cars in Burlington are on all fours with the satellite 
units and vehicles in the case at hand. The fact is, the whole of a vehicle is not greater 
than the sum of its parts. A vehicle is nothing more than parts, and each of the parts 
constituting the vehicle, including satellite units, should be exempt from sales tax under 
the Authorized Carrier Exemption. 
III. Exempting the Satellite Units as Part of the Vehicles Fulfills the Legislative 
Intent of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. 
The Utah Legislature passed the Authorized Carrier Exemption in 1995 to bring 
purchases of vehicles and vehicle accessories into the state of Utah. If the Supreme Court 
rules against Simon, it will frustrate that intent and drive sales outside Utah. For several 
decades prior to 1995, interstate trucks and truck accessories were exempt from sales tax 
based on their involvement in interstate commerce. However, the trucking companies 
could obtain the exemption only if they played a "Commerce Clause game" by taking 
delivery of the trucks outside of Utah, taking their first load to a location outside Utah, 
and then signing a Tax Commission affidavit attesting that they had taken these steps. In 
1995, the Legislature decided the game was silly and was driving commerce outside of 
Utah, and also decided that it wanted trucks to be purchased from Utah dealers, not 
dealers in other states. It thus passed the Authorized Carrier Exemption to accomplish 
these two purposes. If the Court holds that the satellite units are not exempt, it will 
frustrate the purpose of the Authorized Carrier Exemption because the trucking 
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companies will be forced to play the Commerce Clause game again to obtain the 
exemption for vehicle accessories. 
The recorded legislative history is very descriptive as to why the exemption was 
passed. On the House Floor, the bill's sponsor, John Valentine said the following:4 
House Bill 120, authorized carrier exemption, gives an interesting problem 
that weVe had occur in the state. If you buy a . . . tractor trailer . . . you buy 
it out of state, and you take your first trip to someplace else other than Utah, 
and then you bring it into Utah, and you use it in Utah all the whole rest of 
the useful life of that particular item. Now why do you do that? It's 
because . . . if you buy it in the state of Utah, you're going to pay sales tax 
on it. So nobody does it. Instead, you . . . do that little route that I just told 
you about, and therefore you don't pay sales tax on it. We have virtual 
noncompliance in this area . . . It is my impression that we lose sales out of 
the state of Utah to out-of-state vendors, Colorado and Wyoming primarily, 
due to the fact that we have an oddball situation in this area. If we brought 
these sales into Utah, we would end up with sales that meet the content of 
the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, but we would have 
the sales occurring here in the state of Utah and derive the income from it. 
In a Senate Committee Meeting, Representative Valentine said: 
What this bill does is says enough's enough. We don't have do the circular 
route anymore. We should not have those people paying sales tax because 
nobody's paying sales tax in this area. 
Senator Hillyard, the Senate sponsor of House Bill 120, added the following on the 
Senate Floor: 
It's a simple bill, and what it is is if you buy and operate equipment in 
interstate commerce, then there is no sales tax, and so where they buy them 
is outside of the state of Utah. 
4
 A copy of House Bill 120, the entire recorded Legislative History of the bill, and 
an Affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of the recorded history is found in Exhibit F. 
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In short, the Legislature passed the exemption to allow companies to quit playing 
the Commerce Clause game, and to bring economic activity into Utah. Under Utah law, 
any truck accessory that was "installed and equipped" on the truck when the truck came 
into Utah was part of the truck and exempt from sales and use tax under the Commerce 
Clause along with the truck. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 169 P.2d 
804, 808 (Utah 1946) (concurring opinion of Justice Wade); see also Helson v. 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929) (holding that the gasoline in a ferry 
boat is as much an instrumentality of interstate commerce as the boat itself). If a 
company purchased a tire, or a satellite unit, out-of-state, and placed it on the truck 
out-of-state, the purchase of the accessory was exempt just like the truck. Obviously, 
almost all accessories were purchased tax-free out-of-state prior to 1995.5 
The whole purpose of the bill was to put an end to the Commerce Clause game, 
and to bring the sales exempted by the Commerce Clause into the state of Utah. If the 
Court finds in this case that the satellite units are taxable, trucking companies will 
immediately start playing the Commerce Clause game again, going outside of Utah to 
5
 The Legislative History supports the notion that Utah was collecting virtually no 
sales tax on vehicles and accessories prior to 1995. Representative Valentine stated that 
"nobody's paying sales tax in this area." The fiscal note on the exemption was very small 
($150,000). Furthermore, as Representative Valentine noted, "the fiscal note . . . was 
obtained in such a way that it was just a best guess that somebody must not be [playing 
the commerce clause game.] Senator Hillyard added that the fiscal note "says $150,000, 
and the people who brought the bill to me tell me that theyVe gone to the sellers of these 
items. They say we never pay any sales tax because we never buy them in the state of 
Utah. They don't know where the $150,000 came from . . . We don't think it should have 
any [fiscal note.]" 
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ensure that all purchases of truck accessories are exempt. This is exactly what the 
Legislature tried to avoid. To be consistent with the plain meaning and intent and 
purpose of House Bill 120 (1995), the Court should hold that the Satellite Units are 
exempt from taxation. 
IV. The Tax Commission's Treatment of Passenger Tramways under the 
Passenger Tramway Exemption Serves as a Guide for How Vehicles Should 
Be Treated under the Authorized Carrier Exemption. 
The Tax Commission has been inconsistent in the way it interprets similar 
exemptions. In this case, the Tax Commission and district court ruled that the term 
"vehicle" does not include the parts used to build a vehicle. However, in interpreting the 
statutory exemption for "passenger tramways," or ski lifts (see Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-104(41 ))56 the Commission ruled just the opposite. The Court should use the 
Commission treatment of passenger tramways as a guide for how "vehicles" should be 
treated. 
In 1998, a ski resort requested an advisory opinion from the Tax Commission as to 
how the passenger tramway exemption should be interpreted. The Commission advised 
that the ski resort could purchase tax free "the tramway and all of its essential parts or 
accessories." See Tax Commission Advisory Opinion Dated February 3, 1998 entitled 
"Sales Tax Exemption - Ski Tramways"; see also April 24, 1997 Advisory Opinion on the 
same subject (both attached hereto as Exhibit G) (emphasis added). The Commission 
6
 In 1999, the term "passenger tramway" in the exemption was changed to 
"passenger ropeway," but the change did not alter the substance of the exemption. 
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obviously realized it would be illogical to exempt only the ski lift bench, or the gondola 
car, but not the cables, nuts, screws and other accessories to the tramway. It would be 
similarly illogical to exempt only the cab and chassis of a vehicle, just because the other 
parts of the vehicle were purchased from a different vendor, as they often are. The Court 
should follow the Commission's approach in the passenger tramway arena and rule that 
Simon's purchases of satellite units are exempt from sales tax. 
V. The District Court Erred in Ruling That Facts Occurring After a Transaction 
are Irrelevant for Sales Tax Purposes. 
The district court erred in its decision in part because it was working from a faulty 
premise relating to the nature of sales tax. The district court correctly noted that "sales 
tax is a transaction tax, which means the tax is upon the transaction itself, not the property 
involved in the transaction." Following this statement, however, the district court made a 
leap in logic. The court said "[b]ecause the sales tax is a transaction tax, the tax accrues 
at the time of the transaction [and thus] the only relevant and material facts in this case 
are those which occurred and were in place at the time the actual transaction took place." 
Based on this premise, for which no support was cited by the court or by Appellee, 
the court ruled that it was irrelevant that Simon's satellite units ended up on a truck. All 
that mattered to the court was that the satellite units were not part of a "vehicle" at the 
time they were purchased. The position of the district court has no basis in the law, and 
indeed contradicts the manner in which several different Utah sales tax exemptions are 
ascertained. For instance, the following exemptions all require the taxpayer and the Tax 
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Commission to look at events after the initial sale/purchase transaction to determine 
whether an exemption exists for that purchase: 
1. Under the pollution control exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(11), the 
materials purchased are not exempt at the time of purchase because they could be 
used for any purpose. The materials do not become exempt until they are used in a 
pollution control facility. Moreover, pollution control materials are not exempt 
until the pollution control facility is certified. When materials are purchased prior 
to certification, facts do not yet exist which could make them exempt. It is the 
later certification that creates the exemption for the antecedent purchase. 
2. Under the manufacturing exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(14), not all 
machinery and equipment purchases are exempt from sales tax. Only when it 
becomes known that the machinery and equipment is used in the manufacturing 
process and meets other tests are certain machinery and equipment purchases sales 
tax exempt. 
3. Under the exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(19) for sprays and 
insecticides, the sprays and insecticides are not exempt until they are used in 
agricultural production. 
4. Under the farming exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20), the property 
purchased is not exempt until it is used for agricultural purposes. 
5. Under the resale exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(26), the property in 
question is not exempt until it is resold. Often property is purchased tax exempt as 
a purchase for resale, but the property is never resold, and must thus be taxed. 
6. Under the steel mill exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(30), the property 
purchased is not exempt until it is used in a steel mill; 
7. Under the exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(32), property is exempt if it 
is shipped outside the state and incorporated into real property. It cannot be 
ascertained at the time the property is purchased whether it will be shipped outside 
Utah. The exemption is thus dependent on post-transaction events. 
8. Under the passenger ropeway exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(41), the 
materials purchased are not exempt until incorporated into a passenger ropeway. 
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9. Under the industrial use exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(42), the fuel 
purchased is not exempt until it is used for mining, manufacturing or agriculture. 
10. Lastly, under the semiconductor exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(52), 
the materials purchased are not exempt until used in a semiconductor facility. 
All ten of these enumerated exemptions are contingent on events occurring after 
the transaction. At the time of the transaction, it cannot be ascertained for certain whether 
the transaction is exempt or not. At the time of the transaction, the parties must look at 
intent to determine taxability, then often must go back after the fact and adjust the 
taxability depending on whether the property is used for an exempt purpose. Because of 
this, the district court's analysis that a sales tax exemption can only be allowed based on 
the facts existing at the time of the transaction is flawed and its decision should be 
reversed by this Court. This Court should make the correct ruling that the Authorized 
Carrier Exemption is like the other ten listed exemptions and that items that will become 
part of the finished vehicle, such as the satellite units at issue, are exempt from sales tax 
once it becomes known they are part of an exempt vehicle. 
VI. The District Court Erred in Ruling That No Set of Facts Could be Proven 
Under Which the Satellite Units Would be Exempt from Sales Tax. 
By granting the Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court in 
effect ruled that no set of facts could be proven by Simon that would make the satellite 
units exempt from sales tax. This ruling was in error. If Simon had been allowed to 
proceed to trial, it would have offered additional evidence that would help support its 
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argument that the satellite units are simply one part of a tax exempt vehicle. For instance, 
Simon would have offered evidence that: 
1. A satellite unit was attached to every new truck before the truck was 
placed into service; 
2. Simon did not pay the manufacturer for the trucks, and did not begin 
depreciating the trucks or satellite units until after the satellite units were installed and the 
trucks were placed in service; 
3. The industry segment Simon competes in requires it to have satellite 
unit capability; 
4. The satellite units cannot be practically used anywhere but on the 
trucks; and 
5. The satellite units are as integral and necessary to the operation of 
the truck as are the hundreds of other parts that, when combined, form a vehicle. 
These facts, along with the others explained above, all work together to show that 
Simon's trucks are not really complete until the satellite units are installed and the trucks 
are placed into service. Prior to the trucks being placed in service, they were still being 
built by Simon. After the trucks arrive from the manufacturer, Simon does a thorough 
maintenance check of the trucks, registers and licenses the trucks, cures any 
manufacturing defects in the trucks pursuant to an agency agreement with the 
manufacturer, installs the satellite units, and adds load-locks, trailers, company 
identification and detailing, government required markings, and government required 
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safety equipment such as fire extinguishers, mud flaps, and reflective triangles. Simon 
also installs the tires because the manufacturers generally ship the trucks with the tires 
detached. 
It is only after all of these elements of the truck production process come together 
that Simon places the trucks into service, pays for the trucks, and begins depreciating 
them. Accordingly, each part of the truck that is purchased and made part of the truck 
during this production process, including the satellite units, should be exempt from sales 
tax. 
VII. A Ruling that the Satellite Units are Taxable Will Create Bad Tax Policy. 
If the Court rules that the satellite units are taxable, it will create bad tax policy 
relating to fairness and efficiency. As to fairness, two identical trucks will be treated 
differently depending on how they are manufactured. One trucking company might 
purchase in one transaction an expensive, over-outfitted truck with several unnecessary 
bells and whistles, and everything on the truck will be tax free. On the other hand, 
another trucking company might purchase a cab and chassis in one transaction, and all of 
the add-ons (even necessary add-ons like tires) in several other transactions, and build a 
less expensive truck itself, and much of the truck will be taxed. This is unfair, and creates 
bad tax policy by treating identical trucks differently based solely on the form rather than 
the substance of vehicle purchases. This would violate the principle established by this 
Court that form may not be exalted over substance in the sales tax arena. See Harper 
Investments, Inc. v. Tax Comm 7z, 868 P.2d 813, 816 (Utah 1994) (noting in a sales tax 
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case that "the underlying facts of ownership should govern, not the manner in which the 
transactions were accounted for"); South Central Utah Telephone Assoc, v. Tax Comm 'n, 
951 P.2d 218, 226 (Utah 1997) (noting that the characterization of a phone company's 
relationship v/ith its customers as a rental relationship for sales tax purposes "ignores both 
the form and substance of that relationship").7 
As to efficiency, the Court must consider what trucking companies are going to do. 
If the vehicle accessories are not exempt under the Authorized Carrier Exemption, the 
companies will either play the Commerce Clause game, or will have the accessory dealer 
sell the accessory to the truck manufacturer, who will then sell the truck and the accessory 
to the trucking company in one "transaction." There is no sound reason to force these 
futile exercises. 
This is a case where the Court has the opportunity to draw a line that creates good 
policy. Fostering inequality is not good tax policy. Neither is forcing companies to flee 
the state and jump through silly but lawful and effective tax avoidance hoops to escape 
the sales tax. A much more simple and fair solution and rule of reason is to simply do as 
7
 See also Maurer v. Indiana Dep 't of Rev., 607 N.E.2d 985, 987 (Ind. Tax Court 
1993) (stating in a sales tax case that "the substance, not the form, of a transaction 
determines its tax consequences"); St. Gabriel Industrial Ent. Inc. v. Broussard, 602 
So.2d 1087, 1088 (La. App. 1992) (stating in a sales tax case that "the substance of a 
transaction, not its form, is controlling for purposes of classifying a transaction as taxable 
or not"); State v. Marmon Industries, Inc., 456 So.2d 798, 802 (Alab. App. 1984) (stating 
in a sales tax case that "substance, not form, must govern the determination of tax 
matters"); In re O. W. Ltd. Ptr., 668 P.2d 56, 63 (Haw. App. 1983) (stating in a sales tax 
case that "it is well settled that in determining tax liability, the substance of a transaction 
rather than its form governs"). 
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the Commission has done with the Passenger Tramway Exemption — to exempt "all of 
[the vehicle's] essential parts or accessories."8 The Court should issue such an Order, 
reversing the district court's order, and ruling that Simon's purchases of satellite units are 
exempt under the Authorized Carrier Exemption. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the Order of the district 
court and hold that a partially self-manufactured vehicle is tax exempt to the same extent 
as a vehicle manufactured in a factory, thus exempting Simon's purchases of satellite 
units from sales tax. This Court should then remand the case to the district court with 
instructions that the satellite units will be exempt if Simon can prove at trial that the units 
were placed on exempt trucks. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of April, 2002. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
nUmk 
Mark K. Buchi 
Steven P. Young 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
8
 See Tax Commission Advisory Opinion Dated February 3, 1998 entitled "Sales 
Tax Exemption - Ski Tramways"; see also April 24, 1997 Advisory Opinion on the same 
subject (both attached hereto as Exhibit G). 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DICK SIMON TRUCKING, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs . 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990404442 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
On March 1, 2001 the Utah State Tax Commission's Motion for 
Summary Judgment came before this Court pursuant to a Motion for 
Reconsideration. Mark K. Buchi appeared and argued on behalf of 
Petitioner, Dick Simon Trucking. Michelle Bush appeared and 
argued on behalf of Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Court heard oral arguments on the Commission's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and has reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda and upon being advised on the premises makes the 
following findings and ruling: 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The issue before the Court is whether Dick Simon 
Trucking's purchases of satellite tracking units are exempt from 
Utah sales tax as "sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of 
vehicles by an authorized carrier." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(36) (2000). This exemption is known as the "authorized 
carrier exemption." 
2. Dick Simon is a Utah based trucking company. 
3. Dick Simon was an "authorized carrier" during the time 
period at issue. 
4. From April 1, 1993 through December 31, 1995, Dick Simon 
purchased several satellite tracking units from the vendor and 
manufacturer, Qualcomm, Inc. 
5. Dick Simon purchased the satellite tracking units in 
transactions which were separate and distinct from the purchase 
of any vehicle. 
6. The satellite tracking units were not purchased by Dick 
Simon for resale. 
7. The satellite tracking units are tangible personal 
property as described in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (2000). 
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8. The satellite tracking units themselves are not 
"vehicles" and do not qualify as "vehicles" under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-la-102. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RULING 
9. Summary Judgment is proper where "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56 (c) . 
10. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1), "[t]here is 
levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: (a) retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state." 
11. The Utah sales tax is a transaction tax, which means 
that the tax is upon the transaction itself, not the property 
involved in the transaction. 
12. Because the sales tax is a transaction tax, the tax 
accrues at the time of the transaction. 
13. Because the sales tax accrues at the time of the 
transaction, the only relevant and material facts in this case 
are those which occurred and were in place at the time the actual 
transaction took place. 
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14. In this case, facts which occurred after the 
transactions at issue here are not relevant or material for 
purposes of Summary Judgment. Though there are disputes as to 
some of the facts which occurred after the transactions at issue, 
those facts are not material or relevant to the application of 
the authorized carrier exemption. 
15. It is undisputed that the satellite tracking units are 
not "vehicles," and that the satellite tracking units were 
purchased separately from any vehicle and were not part of a 
"vehicle" at the time of purchase by Dick Simon. 
16. When the undisputed facts are considered in light of 
the transactional nature of the sales tax, it is apparent that 
the "authorized carrier" exemption, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(36), does not apply here and does not exempt Dick Simon's 
purchases of satellite tracking units. 
17. Moreover, as it is undisputed that the satellite 
tracking units were not purchased by Dick Simon for resale, the 
"purchase for resale" exemption of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(26) 
does not apply here. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that there are no 
material facts in dispute and the Commission is entitled to 
4 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
THEREFORE, the Utah State Tax Commission's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
5 
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH J^J-f^fSQ. Cdputy 
DICK SIMON TRUCKING, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 990404442 
DATE: October 24, 2000 
JUDGE: GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
This matter came before the Court upon three motions, Respondent's Motion to Strike, 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in 
the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Respondent's Motion to Strike Paragraphs (9), (10), (12), (14), (16), and (19) 
from the Affidavit of Alban Lang submitted in support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was not opposed by Petitioner and is hereby granted. 
2. There are several factual disputes and issues that need to be presented and heard 
by the Court, therefore Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgement is hereby DENIED. 
3. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgement is also DENIED for these same 
reasons. 
To narrow the issues of the case, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. The issue before the Court is whether Simon's purchases of satellite units from 
Qualcomm, Inc. between April 1, 1993 and December 31, 1995 qualify for Utah's statutory sales 
tax exemption for "sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by an authorized carrier." UCA 
59-12-104(36). 
2. Satellite units are used by the trucking industry to track vehicles, primarily those 
used by interstate carriers. 
3. Sales tax is a transaction tax. 
4. Satellite tracking units do not, by themselves, meet the definition of a vehicle. 
5. Satellite tracking units have been included within the statutory definition of a 
vehicle by the State Tax Commission when (1) they were made a part of an original purchase 
from the manufacturer of the vehicle or (2) when they were purchased for resale by a leasing 
company which installed them in the vehicle and then leased them back to the carrier. 
6. The Tax Commission in this case found no exemption based solely upon the nature 
of the transaction, but additional facts need to be presented in order to decide if the purchases fell 
within the statutory exemptions and whether the financing arrangement using the units as security 
for a loan should be differentiated from a purchase, installation, and lease of a vehicle. 
7. The Tax Commission has, in practice, granted exemptions prior to the effective 
date of the statute. 
8. The legislative history may have to be examined to help determine the intent of the 
statute in question and a proper application thereof. 
9. Certain other facts are critical at a factual hearing, namely: which units, if any, or 
all, were warehoused; which units, if any, were installed on which vehicles; the timing of the 
installation, whether installation occurred before the vehicle was placed into service, the timing of 
the purchase and the purchaser's intent at the time of purchase, and whether specific vehicles 
were intended for and were subsequently used in interstate commerce. 
Hopefully this RULING will satisfy both parties objections to the proposed ORDERS 
previously submitted. The Respondent should draft a new ORDER consistent with this ruling aid 
submit it to Petitioner for approval as to form. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 2000. 
cc: Steven P. Young 
Clark Snelson 
X
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH —^f^ftH &fP~~ 
DICK SIMON TRUCKING, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 990404442 
DATE: April 20, 2001 
JUDGE: GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
This matter came before the Court upon the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Ruling. This matter was argued before the Court on March 1, 2001, with Mark Buchi arguing for 
the petitioner and Michelle Bush arguing for the Respondent. The Court has reviewed the file, 
considered the memoranda of counsel, heard oral arguments, and upon being advised on the 
premises, now issues the following ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
1. On October 24, 2000, this Court issued a ruling on the both the petitioner's and 
respondent's Motions for Summary Judgment. In the ruling, the Court denied both motions for 
summary judgment stating that there were "several factual disputes and issues that needed to be 
heard by the Court." (Ruling, October 24, 2000, para 2,3). In the ruling, the court also made 
several findings to narrow the issues to be presented. 
2. On November 8, 2000, the state filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling and 
Findings with supporting memorandum. 
3. On November 20, the defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration of Ruling and Findings. 
4. On March 1, 2001, the Court heard oral arguments on the Motion for Reconsideration. 
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RULING 
1. The state has moved for reconsideration of three points in the October 24, 2000 ruling: 
(1) denying summary judgment on the basis that facts are in dispute, (2) denial of the 
Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment, (3) findings in paragraphs 6 and 7. 
2. The issue before the Court is whether Simon's purchases of satellite units from 
Qualcomm, Inc. between April 1, 1993 and December 31, 1995 qualify for Utah's statutory sales 
tax exemption for "sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by an authorized carrier." UCA 
59-12-104(36). 
3. Summary judgment is proper where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.56(c). 
There are several material facts pertinent to this motion. First, whether the purchase of 
the satellite units by Dick Simon from Qualcomm were made in a separate and distinct transaction 
than the purchase of the trucks for which the satellite units were purchased. Second, whether the 
satellite units in and of themselves qualify as a "vehicle" under U.C.A. § 41-la-102. Third, when, 
and upon what, does sales tax accrue. 
First, whether the purchase of the satellite units by Dick Simon from Qualcomm were 
made in a separate and distinct transaction from the purchase of the vehicles for which the satellite 
units were purchased. The parties are in agreement that the satellite units were purchased from 
Qualcomm in a separate and distinct transaction from the purchase of any vehicle for which the 
satellite units were purchased for installation. (Dick Simon's Answer to Commission's Request 
for Admission No. 3) 
Second, whether the satellite units, in and of themselves, qualify as a "vehicle" under 
U.C.A. § 41-la-102. The Court in its findings of fact in the October 24, 2000, ruling stated in 
paragraph 4, "Satellite tracking units do not, by themselves, meet the definition of a vehicle." ITiis 
fact is also undisputed by the parties. See, Dick Simon's Request for Admissions Nos. 4,5,6,7, 
and 8. This finding of fact excludes the possibility that the satellite units, in and of themselves, 
qualify as a "vehicle." 
Satellite tracking units have been included within the statutory definition of a vehicle by 
the State Tax Commission when (1) they were made a part of an original purchase from the 
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manufacturer of the vehicle or (2) when they were purchased for resale by a leasing company 
which installed them in the vehicle and then leased them back to the carrier. 
At the time of purchase, the satellite units were not part of an original purchase from the 
manufacturer of the vehicle, thus eliminating this possibility of being within the statutory 
exemptions. 
Third, when, and upon what, does sales tax accrue. The court has found in paragraph 3 of 
the ruling on October 24, 2000, that "sales tax is a transaction tax." Thus sales tax, being a 
transaction tax, would accrue at the time of the transaction, not some later date. This further 
indicates that the tax is upon the transaction itself and not the property for which the transaction is 
taking place. 
The fact that sales tax is a transaction tax makes the only relevant and material facts those 
which occur and are in place at the time the actual transaction takes place. Therefore, all facts 
which occurred after the transaction are not material to this motion for summary judgment. 
There are disputes as to these after the transaction facts, ie. what happened to the satellite units 
after purchase, were they placed in trucks prior to the vehicle being placed in interstate 
commerce, were they placed in new vehicles, and what was the purchaser's intent at the time of 
purchase. These facts however, are not material, therefore, "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact." 
4. With no material facts in dispute, the second step is whether the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Dick Simon is claiming an exemption under the 
authorized carrier exemption found in UCA § 59-12-104(36). In accordance with the factual 
analysis, the transaction involving the purchase of satellite units from Qualcomm must be 
considered as a singular isolated event. The undisputed facts are that the satellite units are not 
"vehicles," the satellite units were purchased separately and were not part of a "vehicle" at the 
time of purchase, and sales tax is a transaction tax. The satellite units were not purchased for 
resale, therefore the resale exemption does not apply. 
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The authorized carrier exemption, at the time of the transaction, was not applicable to 
exempt sales tax on the purchase of satellite units from Qualcomm by Dick Simon Trucking. 
Therefore, upon reconsideration, the Court finds no material facts in dispute and the Tax 
Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
Counsel for the Respondent is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it 
to counsel prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Michelle Bush 
4 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
DICK SIMON TRUCKING, INC., 
Petitioner, 
AUDITING DIVISION OF 
THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION. 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 96-2238 
Tax Type: Sales & Use 
Judge: McKeown 
Presiding: 
Richard B. McKeown, Commission Chair 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Mark K. Buchi and Steven P. Young, Holme Roberts & Owen, counsel 
for Petitioner 
For Respondent: Michelle Bush, Office of the Attorney General, counsel for 
Respondent 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
December 17, 1998. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax 
Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Audit Period and Audit Assessments 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The audit period at issue is April 1, 1993 through December 31, 1995. 
3. After audit, Respondent issued a statutory notice to Dick Simon Trucking, dated 
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August 30, 1996, assessing $121,873.34 in additional tax an imposing an 10% negligence penalty 
of $12,187.35 and $17,766.59 as interest. 
4. On the basis of additional information supplied to Respondent by Petitioner, the 
initial audit assessment was adjusted on March 19, 1997. The adjusted assessment reflects an 
assessment of tax in the amount of $99,303.03 and reduced the penalty to $9,930.30. The 
interest was reduced to $29,369.80. 
5. On October 30, 1998, Respondent issued another amended assessment notice 
which reduced the amount of tax owed to $86,958.17. The penalty was reduced to $8,695.82 and 
the interest was reduced to $27,211.81. This audit adjustment was not based on any new 
information from Petitioner. 
6. The statutory notice issued to Petitioner included assessments of sales tax on 
various transactions, many of which are not in dispute. Specifically at issue in this appeal are 
Petitioner's tax free purchases of satellite equipment from the equipment maker, Qualcomm, Inc. 
Application of "Authorized Carrier" Provisions 
7. Petitioner is a commercial trucking company based in Utah, and it buys or leases 
semi-trucks for the purpose of hauling freight throughout the country. 
8. Petitioner is an "authorized carrier" within the meaning of section 59-12-102 of 
the Utah Code Ann, which was enacted in 1995 and became effective on July 1, 1995. Prior to 
that time, Petitioner was an "authorized carrier" as defined by Utah Administrative Rule R865-
19-97S, which was in effect during a portion of the audit period. 
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Acquisitions of Vehicles 
9. During the audit period, Petitioner purchased several semi-truck tractors and 
trailers in Utah without paying sales tax. 
10. New trucks were delivered to Petitioner from the manufacturer prewired and with 
brackets in place to accommodate the installation of the satellite systems. 
11. Upon receiving the trucks from the manufacturer and before placing the trucks 
into service, Petitioner performed maintenance checks, registered and licensed the trucks, and 
cured any defects pursuant to its agreement with the manufacturer. It added load-locks, trailers, 
company identification and detailing, government required markings, and government required 
safety equipment. Petitioner also installed the tires because the manufacturers typically shipped 
them with the tires detached. 
12. During the audit period, Petitioner purchased accessories for installation on its 
vehicles, including paint, radios, and mud flaps. Petitioner paid sales tax on its purchases of 
these accessories. 
Acquisition and Installation of Satellite Systems 
13. During the audit period, Petitioner purchased several pieces of satellite equipment 
directly from the equipment maker, Qualcomm, Inc. ("Qualcomm"). The purchases of satellite 
equipment were separate transactions from Petitioner's purchases or acquisitions of any vehicles. 
14. The satellite equipment is specifically designed to be installed on semi-truck 
vehicles. A satellite system consists of a keyboard and console that are used inside the cab of the 
truck and a small dome that is mounted on the outside of a vehicle. The equipment can be 
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installed or removed from the vehicles without substantially altering the vehicles appearance or 
functional operation. 
15. The satellites allow Petitioner to track each truck's location at all times, to 
accurately track and report fuel and road usage for tax purposes, and to provide directions or 
traffic information to drivers. 
16. The satellite equipment was purchased by Petitioner from its vendor Qualcomm, 
Inc. The equipment was delivered to Petitioner via common carrier, and Petitioner paid 
Qualcomm directly by check. 
17. At some point during the audit period, Petitioner issued an exemption certificate 
to Qualcomm so that Qualcomm would not bill sales tax on Petitioner's purchases of satellite 
equipment. 
18. Prior to the issuance of the exemption certificate, Qualcomm typically included 
sales tax on its invoices to Petitioner, but Petitioner did not pay the sales tax. After the 
exemption certificate was issued, Qualcomm no longer included Utah sales tax on its invoices to 
Petitioner. 
19. During the audit period, Petitioner had its existing fleet of trucks retrofitted to 
accept installation of satellite units. All new trucks were ordered prewired and bracketed for 
installation of the systems. 
20. Petitioner's employees installed all of the satellite systems on its trucks at its Salt 
Lake facility. In the case of new trucks, the installation was made before putting the trucks into 
service. Installation consisted of bolting the cylindrical antenna onto the pre-existing bracket 
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with four bolts placing the keyboard and computer system onto pre-existing brackets and 
plugging the keyboard and computer system into pre-existing wires. 
21. When Petitioner sells one of its vehicles, it generally removes the satellite 
equipment and other accessories and installs the items on another vehicle owned by Petitioner. 
Lease or Lease back Arrangements 
22. When Petitioner acquires trucks and satellite units, it structures and finances the 
transactions in a variety of ways, depending on which arrangement is most beneficial to the 
company. 
a. Petitioner obtains a loan from a lender, and it purchases the trucks and 
satellite systems directly from the vendors. Petitioner depreciates the equipment for state and 
federal income tax purposes. During the audit period, Petitioner depreciated some of the 
satellite equipment at issue on its internal "depreciation expense report" independently of any 
vehicles. 
b. Petitioner purchases the trucks and satellite systems directly from the 
vendors, then transfers the property to the lender, who leases the property back to Petitioner. 
23. During the audit period, Petitioner entered financing arrangements with Mercedes 
Benz Credit and KeyCorp Leasing ("KeyCorp"). 
24. The vehicles that were the subject of the arrangement with KeyCorp were titled in 
the name of Dick Simon, as owner, with KeyCorp as a lien holder. None of the title applications 
on these vehicles showed KeyCorp as a lessor. 
26. The title applications for the vehicles that were the subject of the lease 
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arrangement with KeyCorp were signed by a representative of Dick Simon Trucking who attested 
that "under penalties of perjury (I/We) the undersigned, declare that (I am/We are) the owner(s) 
of the vehicle identified above, that all above information is correct and complete, and that this 
vehicle is and will be lawfully insured anytime it is operated on a highway within the state." 
27. The vehicles that were the subject of the lease arrangement with KeyCorp were all 
registered with the State of Utah in the name of Dick Simon Trucking. 
28. The KeyCorp lease agreement contains a specific statement that the lease is a 
"true lease," except that to the extent that Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to 
the characteri2:ation of the lease, it is a "finance lease." 
29. By terms of the contract's "true lease" provisions, the title to the equipment 
remains in KeyCorp and Petitioner may not acquire more that a leasehold interest during the term 
of the lease. 
30. Under terms of the KeyCorp lease, the lessor is treated as the owner of the 
property for Federal Income Tax purposes, and, therefore, entitled to the depreciation or cost 
recovery deductions for both Federal Income Tax purposes under the IRS Code and for state 
income tax purposes for the State of New York. Petitioner depreciates all equipment that is not 
subject to the KeyCorp agreement. 
31. The term of the KeyCorp lease is 36 months. Under the terms of the lease, 
Petitioner may purchase the equipment at a price equal to the fair market value of the property 
before the expiration of the lease. Otherwise, KeyCorp may require Petitioner to sell the 
equipment to a third party on behalf of KeyCorp and pay any residual deficiency due under the 
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lease. 
10% Negligence Penalty 
32. Respondent imposed a 10% negligence penalty in this audit on the basis that the 
Division believed that the Respondent has imposed a deficiency assessment on Petitioner in a 
prior audit for the same type of errors. 
33. The prior audit for the period of October 1989 to September 1992 was performed 
by Rod Boogard and Jim Asay. 
34. At issue in the prior audit were purchases of satellite equipment from Qualcomm, 
Inc. The prior audit did not include all purchases of satellite equipment because KeyCorp billed 
Petitioner for tax on some of the transactions up until the time that Petitioner gave KeyCorp an 
exemption certificate. Petitioner paid the audit amounts without appeal. 
35. During the course of the prior audit, the auditors discussed the application of the 
authorized carrier exemption with Petitioner's representative. There is a dispute about the 
auditor's instructions concerning future application of the authorized carrier rule. 
a. Petitioner's representative stated that he was instructed that separately 
purchased satellite equipment is exempt from sales and use tax so long as it is affixed to a 
vehicle prior to placing the vehicle in service. 
b. Notes in the audit file indicate that the auditors instructed Petitioner that 
separately purchased satellite equipment is subject to tax. 
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tax: 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-102 (65) (Supp. 1993) states in pertinent part: 
"Vehicle" includes a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer . . . . 
2. Utah Code Arm. §59-12-102 states in pertinent part: 
As used in this chapter: 
(2) "Authorized carrier" means: 
(a) in the case of vehicles operated over public highways, the holder of 
credentials indicating that the vehicle is or will be operated pursuant to 
both the International Registration Plan (IRP) and the International Fuel 
Tax Agreement (IFTA); 
(21) "Vehicle" means . . . any vehicles, as defined in Section 41-la-102; 
3. Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104 (12) (Supp. 1995)1 exempts from Utah sales and use 
"sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing under 
the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of this 
state;" 
4. Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104 (27) (Supp. 1995) exempts from Utah sales and use 
tax: 
"property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of 
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or 
component part of a manufactured product." 
i Some of the statutes referenced in this case have been renumbered one or more times over the 
years of the audit period at issue here. We have referenced the code provisions that were in effect during the audit 
period. 
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5. Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104 (38) (Supp. 1995) (effective July 1, 1995) introduced 
a sales and use tax exemption on: 
"sales and leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by an authorized carrier." 
6. Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-34 (Supp. 1998) states in pertinent part: 
A. Advisory opinions aire written, informational statements of the 
commission's interpretation of statutes or administative rules, or 
informational statements concerning the application of statutes and rules to 
specific facts and circumstances. 
B. The weight afforded an advisory opinion in a subsequent audit or 
administrative appeal depends upon the degree to which the underlying 
facts addressed in the opinion were adequate to allow thorough 
consideration of the issues and the interests involved. 
7. Utah Administrative Rule R865-19S-97 (Supp. 1994) states in pertinent part: 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Authorized carrier" means: 
a) in the case of vehicles: 
(1) the holder of a permit or certificate issued by the United States 
Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing the holder to engage in the 
interstate commerce over highways or other public thoroughfares; or 
(2) the holder of credentials indicating that the vehicle is or will be 
operated pursuant to the International Registration Plan (IRP) and the 
International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA); 
2. "Vehicle" is defined in Section 41-la-102. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. The term "vehicle" as used in the authorized carrier exemption includes all parts 
and accessories installed on and purchased as part of the vehicle in a single transaction. 
Separately acquired vehicle parts or accessories do not qualify for exemption. 
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2. Satellite equipment purchased directly by Petitioner and used as collateral to 
secure a loan is not eligible for exemption under the authorized carrier exemption. 
3. Satellite equipment resold to a lease company, then leased back qualifies for the 
authorized carrier exemption only if it is leased back as part of a qualifying vehicle in the same 
lease transaction. 
4. For purposes of this decision, the Master Lease is construed with all of its 
supplemental Equipment Schedules as a single lease transaction. 
DISCUSSION 
Background 
In 1995, the state legislature amended the Sales and Use Tax Code to exempt from 
taxation "sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by an authorized carrier." Utah Code 
Ann. §59-12-104 (38) (Supp. 1995). The apparent purpose of the exemption was to address 
issues raised by the trucking and railroad industries operating in Utah. Of relevance to this 
matter are the issues raised by the trucking industry. 
Prior to the enactment of the authorized carrier exemption, Utah trucking companies were 
bound to pay sales tax on their purchases of vehicles if (1) they purchased the vehicles in Utah, 
or (2) they purchased the vehicles from an out-of-state dealer, then had the trucks delivered 
directly into Utah. To avoid paying the sales tax, the trucking companies adopted the practice of 
buying their trucks outside of Utah in states that did not impose the sales tax. They put the trucks 
into operation outside of Utah by scheduling each truck to haul at least one load before it was 
brought into the state. Under this scheme, the sales transaction took place outside of Utah and 
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the vehicles were operating in interstate commerce before entering Utah. The trucking 
companies argued, and the Tax Commission agreed, that so long as the trucks were operating in 
interstate commerce before entering the state, Utah could not tax the transactions. See Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-104 (12) (Supp. 1993) (the state is precluded by the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution and other federal law from imposing sales tax on interstate 
commerce), and Union Pacific Railroad v. Utah State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 99, 169 P.2d 
804 (Utah 1946). 
By buying their trucks outside of Utah and putting them into interstate commerce outside 
of Utah, the trucking companies lawfully avoided the Utah tax, but they felt unnecessarily 
inconvenienced by the process. Furthermore, business that might otherwise be transacted with 
Utah truck dealers was diverted out of state. The Tax Commission responded by enacting an 
administrative rule to allow Utah trucking companies to purchase their vehicles in Utah tax 
exempt. Utah Administrative Rule R865-19-97S2 permitted authorized interstate carriers3 to 
purchase trucks, trailers, tractors, or tractor-trailer combinations4 tax free. 
The state legislature took up the authorized carrier issue in its 1995 session. By enacting 
z
 Effective July 15, 1992. 
3
 "Authorized carrier" was defined as: 
(1) the holder of a permit or certificate issued by the United States Interstate Commerce 
Commission authorizing the holder to engage in interstate commerce over highways or other 
public thoroughfares; or 
(2) the holder of credentials indicating that the vehicle is or will be operated pursuant to 
the International Registration Plan (IRP) and the International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA); 
The rule initially exempted the purchase or lease of "a truck, trailer, tractor, or tractor-trailer 
combination for use in interstate commerce by an authorized carrier.. .." The rule was eventually amended to 
define "vehicle" by reference to 41 -1 a-102 of the Utah Code. 
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the authorized carrier exemption, the legislature codified the exemption that the Tax Commission 
had permitted by rule. Upon the legislative enactment of the exemption, the Tax Commission 
repealed its administrative rule R865-19-97S. 
The statutory exemption set out in section §59-12-104 (38) (Supp. 1995) of the Utah 
Code, exempted from sales and use tax all sales or leases of vehicles to by an authorized carrier. 
By the terms of the statutory exemption, an "authorized carrier" is a "the holder of credentials 
indicating that the vehicle is or will be operated pursuant to both the International Registration 
Plan (IRP) and the International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA)." Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102 (2) 
(Supp. 1995). "Vehicle" is defined by reference to section 41-la-102 of the Utah Code. Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-102 (21) (Supp. 1995). 
There is no dispute in this case that Petitioner was, at all times during the audit period an 
authorized carrier within the meaning the relevant rule and statutes cited here. What is in dispute 
is whether Petitioner, as an authorized carrier, was entitled to purchase satellite equipment for its 
trucks tax free. Petitioner offers various theories under which it believes it was entitled to make 
these purchases tax free. First, Petitioner argues that in order to give effect to the legislative 
intent, the word "vehicle" must be read to include all separately purchased parts. Second, 
Petitioner asserts a claim of estoppel against Respondent on the basis that Petitioner relied on the 
Respondent's advice in structuring its transactions. Third, Petitioner claims that it was entitled to 
purchase the satellite equipment tax free under the resale exemption, selling the equipment to a 
leasing company, then lease them back tax free under the authorized carrier exemption as 
components of qualifying vehicles. We address each of these arguments in turn. 
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Definition of "vehicle" 
In enacting the authorized carrier exemption, the legislature provided a definition of 
"vehicle." "Vehicle" means "any vehicle, as defined in Section 41-1 a-102." Utah Code Ann. 
59-12-102 (20) (Supp. 1995). Section 41-la-102 defines "vehicle" as "a motor vehicle, trailer, 
[or] semitrailer . . . ."5 
Petitioner contends that the statutory definition of "vehicle" must be read broadly to 
include all accessories to the vehicle, even those that are purchased in separate transactions from 
the purchase of the vehicle itself. (P. Prehearing Mem. p.4.) Petitioner argues that the satellite 
equipment is exempt because satellite systems "are as essential to the vehicles as are computers 
that run the electronics and fuel systems that permit the vehicles to operate." (P. Prehearing 
Mem. p. 1.) 
To accept Petitioner's argument, we would have to accept the notion that the sales tax on 
its purchases accrues, not at the time of each purchase, but some time later — after Petitioner has 
installed the satellites and other accessories on a vehicle and actually put the vehicle into service. 
However, the sales tax is a tax that accrues on each discreet transaction. Utah Administrative 
Rule R865-19S-2. The sales tax attributable to the component parts of a vehicle is due when the 
component parts are purchased in retail sales by the final consumer. 
5
 The authorized carrier exemption was enacted in 1995 and it became effective on July 1, 1995 
Transactions that occurred during the audit period prior to the enactment of the exemption were subject to the 
definition set out in the Commission's administrative rule R865-19S-97 As we have already stated, the definition of 
"vehicle" in the rule was amended during the time that the rule was in effect, but is was substantially the same as the 
definition that appears in the statute Therefore, the same reasoning applies to transactions that took place prior to 
July 1, 1995 
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Petitioner argues that the transaction accrual scheme that it suggests here has been 
adopted by the Commission in other contexts. Specifically, Petitioner references an advisory 
opinion that the Commission issued regarding the sale and installation of ski resort tramways. In 
that opinion the Commission stated that for purposes of the ski tramway exemption, "the 
tramway and all of its essential parts or accessories [excluding cement foundations and lifthouses 
or other buildings] are considered tangible personal property." Petitioner reasons that if the 
Commission treats the tramway and all of its essential parts as a unit for purposes of that 
exemption, it must also treat the vehicles and the satellite systems as units in this case. 
Petitioner's reliance on the ski tramway advisory opinion is misplaced. That opinion 
addressed the issue of whether the tramway is considered real or personal property for purposes 
of identifying the tax liability of the final consumer. The distinction between real and personal 
property has no application to this case. Furthermore, because the opinion was issued to address 
a different issue and a different set of facts, it carries no weight in this proceeding. Utah Admin. 
R.R861-1A-34. 
Petitioner next claims that the legislature intended to allow Utah trucking companies to 
purchase tax free in Utah anything that they could purchase tax free out of state under the 
Commerce Clause exemption. On that basis, Petitioner hypothesizes that the Commission must 
read the term "vehicle" to include all separately acquired parts and accessories in order to give 
effect to the legislative intent. 
On the issue of legislative intent, Petitioner offered the testimony of Mr. H. Craig Moody. 
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During the 1995 legislative session, Mr. Moody was a registered lobbyist and legislative 
consultant. He was hired by a private tax consultant to lobby the legislature for a sales tax 
exemption to benefit commercial trucking companies in Utah. Mr. Moody testified that prior to 
the exemption, Utah trucking companies avoided Utah sales and use tax by purchasing trucks and 
equipment outside of Utah, then placing them in interstate commerce outside of Utah. He also 
testified that some Utah truck dealers were forced to set up shops in surrounding states so that 
Utah trucking companies could take delivery of their trucks out of state. 
Mr. Moody participated with representatives of other transportation companies to draft 
and lobby for the exemption legislation. As a proponent of the bill, he met individually with 
various members of the legislature to encourage passage of the exemption. 
Mr. Moody testified that the drafting group expressly discussed whether to extend the 
exemption to repair and replacement parts. They decided against including anything other than 
the vehicle itself because the fiscal impact of a broader exemption would jeopardize passage of 
the bill. In Mr. Moody's opinion, however, the legislature intended that the term "vehicle" be 
construed broadly to exempt all items purchased and installed on a qualifying vehicle before it is 
placed in service. 
Respondent objected to Mr. Moody's testimony on the basis that the statute is clear on its 
face, and, therefore, the Commission has no need to look behind it for legislative intent. Mr. 
Moody was allowed to testify, and his reiteration of the events leading to the adoption of this 
exemption provided a useftil perspective on the problems that the transportation companies 
sought to cure. However, we do not rely on Mr. Moody's personal views as an authoritative 
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source of legislative intent. In fact, Mr. Moody disclosed that his discussions about this matter 
took place outside the legislative process in private meetings. He admitted that he did not know 
if the legislature as a whole understood the term "vehicle" to include separately purchased parts 
and accessories. Moreover, he offered no evidence that the legislature even considered whether 
separately purchased parts and accessories would be eligible for exemption. 
The miost competent evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. 
CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n., 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995). The plain 
language of this statute exempts the purchase of a vehicle from sales and use tax. The legislature 
defined "vehicle" to include motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers. It did not define vehicles 
as "vehicle parts and accessories" or "satellite systems." 
We note that the legislative intent discussion has no bearing on the audited transactions 
that predated the enactment of the authorized carrier exemption. However, this is an issue that 
may arise again in the future, so it is important that the Commission state its position on this 
exemption. We find that the language of authorized carrier exemption is specific in its operation 
and intent. The exemption applies to the purchase or lease of a vehicle. "Vehicle" refers to the 
vehicle as it is shipped from the manufacturer, plus all after-factory parts and equipment installed 
as part of the vehicle and purchased or leased in the same transaction as the vehicle. To that 
degree, the vehicle and all of its parts are treated as a unit. The Commission will not sift through 
the component parts of a vehicle to determine which components are "essential." The legislature 
did not grant us the latitude to do so. Likewise, we will not create an exemption for separately 
purchased parts, accessories or equipment where none exists in statute. 
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Equitable Estoppel 
Petitioner contends that Respondent should be estopped from assessing sales tax on the 
transactions at issue in this case because Petitioner purchased the satellites tax free in reliance on 
advice from an auditor in a previous audit. 
In 1992, the Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner for the period of 1989 through 
1992. In that audit, the auditor discovered that Petitioner had purchased satellite equipment 
without paying sales tax on the purchases. Although most of the audit period predated the 
authorized carrier rule that was passed by the Commission in July of 1992, the testimony 
presented indicates that the auditor discussed the authorized carrier exemption with Petitioner's 
representative, Mr. Alban Lang. 
Mr. Lang testified that he understood the auditor to say that Petitioner can purchase 
satellite systems tax free so long as the satellite equipment is installed on qualified vehicles 
before the vehicles are placed in service. Respondent disputes Mr. Lang's characterization of the 
auditor's advice. Mr. Burt Ashcroft, the audit manager who supervised the 1992 audit, testified 
that during the course of the 1992 audit, he discussed the authorized carrier exemption with the 
auditor. Mr. Ashcroft instructed the auditor that it was the division's position that the satellite 
systems were exempt only if purchased as part of the vehicle in a single transaction. 
The auditor who conducted the 1992 audit is no longer employed by the Tax 
Commission, and was not called by either party to testify at the hearing. However, Mr. Ashcroft 
testified that the auditor left work papers and audit notes in the audit file. He testified that the 
notes and work papers indicate that the auditor correctly instructed Mr. Lang as to the division's 
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position on this matter. The notes and work papers were not offered as evidence at the hearing. 
The standard for estoppel against a government entity is a high one. The representations 
asserted must well substantiated, Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah 1995), and as a rule, they 
must be very specific and issued in writing by an authorized person. Holland v. Career Service 
Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). See also. Orion v. State Tax Comm «., 864 P.2d 
904 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Equitable estoppel can be asserted against a state agency only if the 
facts supporting the claim can be substantiated with certainty), and Anderson v. Public Serv. 
Comm '/?., 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) ("The few cases in which Utah courts have permitted 
estoppel against the government have involved very specific written representations by 
authorized government entities^7). Under the circumstances of this case, Petitioner has failed to 
meet the high standard of proof required to prevail on grounds of estoppel. 
Sale and leaseback arrangement 
The next issue to be decided here is whether the Petitioner purchased the satellite 
equipment for resale, then leased it back as part of qualifying vehicles in a single lease 
transaction. For Petitioner to prevail on this point, it must rely on two exemptions: the resale 
exemption and the authorized carrier exemption. 
Section 59-12-104 (27) (Supp. 1995) exempts from sales and use tax "property purchased 
for resale in this state, in the regular course of business, either in its original form or as an 
ingredient or component part of a manufactured product." Petitioner claims that it resold the 
satellite equipment to various financing companies, and it is entitled to claim the resale 
exemption on its purchases. Respondent disagrees on the basis that (1) in order to qualify for the 
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resale exemption, Petitioner must have purchased the items with the intent to resell them, and (2) 
Petitioner never actually resold the satellite systems. 
In support of its first argument, Respondent relies on Broadcast Int 7 v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n., 882 P.2d 691 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Nucor Corp. V. State Tax Comm n., 832 P.2d 
1294 (Utah 1992), in which the courts said "the words 'purchased for resale' implies that a 
company's purpose in buying an item must be to resell that item." Here, Respondent argues, 
Petitioner did not purchase the items with intent to resell it. In fact, Petitioner conjured up its 
resale argument for the first time when it was preparing for the Formal Hearing in this case. 
In Broadcast Int'L, Nucor, and a more recent case, Gull Labs, Inc. V. State Tax Comm 'n., 
936 p.2d 1082 (Utah 1997), the courts considered whether items used in a manufacturing process 
that incidently became part of the finished product may be purchased tax free as component parts 
or ingredients of the final product. The courts resorted to the "intent to resell" standard in the 
manufacturing context to distinguish consumables from ingredients and component parts. We do 
not believe that the court's reasoning in those cases is relevant to the question of whether 
Petitioner is entitled to claim the resale exemption. In fact, the Commission has long recognized 
sale and lease back transactions. Prior to enactment of the sale-leaseback provisions in 1995, the 
Commission took the position that if a party purchased equipment and paid tax on the purchase, 
then transferred ownership of the property to a leasing company under a sale and lease back 
arrangement, the party was entitled to a refund of the sales tax paid on the initial purchase. The 
lease payments, of course, were subject to tax unless otherwise exempt. 
Respondent next argues that Petitioner did not resell the satellite equipment, but merely 
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entered financing agreements with financial institutions. The evidence submitted by the parties 
indicates that the Petitioner entered various kinds of agreements with financial institutions. One 
agreement in evidence shows that Petitioner financed 50 satellite systems with the Mercedes-
Benz Credit Corporation. The document, which was executed during the audit period, is entitled 
"Note and Security Agreement." It is accompanied by a Uniform Commercial Code financing 
state form and a payment agreement. The document does not purport to be anything other than 
an financing agreement to secure payment of a loan. 
Petitioner also submitted two agreements evidencing its arrangements with KeyCorp. 
These documents, entitled "Equipment Schedule No. 01," and "Equipment Schedule No. 04," 
purport to be "true leases." Schedule No. 01 was executed January 24, 1995, and Schedule No. 
04 was entered May 5, 1995. Both schedules state that they are to be considered collectively 
with a Master Lease entered January 24, 1995.6 (Equipment Schedule, Article 14.) Schedule 01 
covers the 10 Freightliner trucks listed on its Exhibit A. Schedule 04 covers 10 Freightliner 
trucks and 20 satellite systems. 
With regard to Petitioner's agreement with Mercedes Benz Credit Corporation, and any 
other agreements cast in the same form, Petitioner's sale and lease back argument fails. The 
agreement is clearly a security agreement, and the secured party is a creditor, not an owner of the 
satellite equipment. Petitioner did not resell the equipment to its creditor, so Petitioner is not 
entitled to rely on the resale exemption. Purchases of satellite equipment do not qualify for the 
The Master Lease itself was not entered into evidence 
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authorized carrier exemption, so Petitioner is not entitled to rely on the authorized carrier 
exemption. 
The KeyCorp lease documents present a different issue. If the KeyCorp transactions 
constitute legitimate sale and leaseback arrangements, and if the satellites where leased by 
Petitioner as components of exempt vehicles in a single vehicle lease transaction, Petitioner may 
rely on the resale exemption and the authorized carrier exemption to avoid the tax.7 
Our inquiry begins with an examination of the KeyCorp agreements to determine whether 
KeyCorp is a secured creditor or an owner and lessor of the satellite equipment. The pertinent 
terms of the KeyCorp agreements are as follows: 
1. By the express language of the agreements, they are "true leases," but to the extent 
that Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to the agreements, they are considered 
"finance leases." (Article 6). 
2. Title to the property listed on Exhibit A (Article 1) remains with the lessor 
(Article 6). 
3. Any improvements to the equipment must be procured by the lessee at the lessee's 
expense (Article 9 (b)), but title to the improvements vest in the lessor at upon installation 
(Article 9 (a) and (c)). 
4. The lessee is required to pay for all permits, licenses, inspections and registration 
fees. The lessee is required to title and register the vehicles in accordance with the laws of Utah 
Petitioner did not execute the appropriate exemption certificates to support its resale exemption 
argument, but the Commission has allowed taxpayer's in other cases to produce exemption certificates after the fact 
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(Article 9 (b)). 
5. KeyCorp is entitled to depreciate the equipment as three year property for income 
tax purposes (Article 5). 
6. The term of the agreement is 36 months (Article 3). AtThe end of that term, the 
lessee has an option to purchase the equipment at a price equal to fair market value (Article 7). If 
the lessee does not purchase the equipment at the end of the term, the lessor may require the 
lessee to sell the equipment to a third party. If such sale nets a deficiency from the market value 
of the equipment, the lessee must pay the lessor an amount equal to the amount of the deficiency. 
(Article 8).8 
7. The lessee agrees that all items returned to Lessor at the end of the lease period 
will be clear of encumbrances; in the same condition as when deliver to lessee, except for 
reasonable wear and tear; and in average saleable condition. (Article 9 (d)). 
Petitioner also submitted a document entitled "Equipment Bill of Sale" with Equipment 
Schedule 04. The document was executed by Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. in favor of KeyCorp, 
and it transfers Petitioner's rights, title and interest in the equipment to KeyCorp. The bill of sale 
bears Dick Simon's signature, but it is not dated, nor does it identify the particular equipment that 
is the subject of the transaction. 
Respondent argues that in spite of the language of the KeyCorp contracts, Petitioner never 
In a separate letter from KeyCorp to Petitioner dated April 10, 1995, this clause was amended to 
read that "'Residual Value' shall mean an amount equal to fifty-five percent (55%) of the Total Cost of the 
Equipment" 
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transferred ownership of the equipment to KeyCorp. Respondent produced copies of title and 
registration documents for some of Petitioner's vehicles that list the Petitioner as the owner of the 
vehicles and KeyCorp as the lienholder. In titling and registering the vehicles, Petitioner fulfilled 
its obligations under the contract to "title, license, inspect and register the Equipment in 
compliance with the laws of any jurisdictions where they may be operated and in such a manner 
as shall protect the interests of the Lessor." (Equipment Schedule, Article 9). However, the title 
and registration documents alone do not establish actual ownership.9 
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Construction Co , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), 
the court set out twelve relevant factors for distinguishing between a lease and a security interest. 
Information pertinent to most of those factors is not in evidence in this case. However, we note 
that by the language of the KeyCorp agreements: (1) the agreements manifest the intent of the 
parties to enter a sale and leaseback agreement, (2) ownership of the equipment vested in 
KeyCorp, and (3) KeyCorp is denominated a lessor and Petitioner is denominated as the lessee. 
Based on the limited evidence in front of us in this matter, we consider these agreements to 
represent true leases for purposes of this decision. 
A determination that the KeyCorp leases represent true sale and lease back agreements 
does not dispose of the issues before us. We have already stated that the term "vehicle" for 
purposes of the authorized carrier exemption includes all equipment that is installed as part of the 
vehicle and purchased or leased in a single transaction. Even if Petitioner qualifies for a resale 
9
 Neither party argued that Petitioner violated the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code by 
identifying itself as the owner of the trucks on title and registration documents, so we do not address that issue here 
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exemption on its purchase of the satellite equipment, it qualifies for exemption on the lease bac k 
only to the extent that the satellite equipment is installed on and leased as part of qualifying 
vehicles. Therefore, to qualify for the authorized carrier exemption, the satellite equipment must 
be sold to a leasing company, then leased back as part of a qualifying vehicle in the same 
transaction. 
Considering the Equipment Schedule agreements before us, we are faced with a decision 
between two reasonable interpretations. Each of the equipment schedules can be considered as 
separate lease agreements because they each cover the specific equipment identified to the 
schedules and the payment agreements are specific to each schedule. If we take that approach, 
the lease payments associated with Equipment Schedule 01 are exempt because the agreement 
covers only Freightliner vehicles, which are clearly exempt under the authorized carrier 
exemption. Presumably, any lease payments on satellites attached to those trucks represent a 
separate taxable transaction, and, therefore are taxable. 
Alternatively, because the two equipment schedules relate back to one Master Lease, we 
can consider the schedules as part of a single transaction. Under this approach, we assume that 
the satellites covered under the Master Lease are installed as parts of vehicles covered by the 
same Master Lease. As such, lease payments associated with the satellite equipment are exempt. 
For purposes of resolving this appeal, we accept the second alternative for its ease of 
administration. We hold that all satellite equipment identified to the Master Lease entered 
January 24, 1995 is exempt. Having arrived at that conclusion to dispose of this case, we 
recognize that this is an issue that deserves more exploration. The Commission will pursue this 
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matter through its rulemaking authority. 
10% Penalty 
Respondent assessed a 10% negligence penalty on Petitioner because the Petitioner had 
been advised in a prior audit that it could not purchase satellite equipment tax free under the 
authorized carrier exemption. We believe that the sale and lease back aspects of these 
transactions is somewhat murky and imposing the penalty on Petitioner is unnecessarily harsh. 
Therefore, the penalty assessment is waived. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds as follows: 
(1) The authorized carrier exemption rule took effect July 15, 1992. Petitioner cannot 
claim the exemption prior to that time. 
(2) Petitioner's separate purchases of satellite equipment are not exempt under the 
authorized carrier exemption. 
(3) The satellites that were resold to a leasing company, then leased back as part of a 
qualifying vehicle in a single lease transaction are exempt. For purposes of deciding this case, 
the satellite equipment listed on Equipment Schedules that relate back to the Master Lease 
entered January 24, 1995 are exempt as sale and lease back transactions. 
(4) The satellite equipment that was purchased by Petitioner then used as collateral to 
secure a loan do not qualify for exemption under the sale and lease back theory. 
(5) The 10% penalty is waived. 
(6) The Commission will solicit input from the Division and the trucking industry for 
- 2 5 -
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the purpose of promulgating an administrative rule to govern future transactions. 
It is so ordered. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED this / / / ±fat£< 
ABSTAINE 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
_, 1999. 
^M^I/VA->JU<LAX^^^ 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for 
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the 
date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-
46b-13 et. seq. 
COMM/IFV99-2238 fin 
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DICK SIMON TRUCKING INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION 
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Appeal No. 96-2238 
Tax Type: Sales Tax 
Judge: Mckeown 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for 
Reconsideration, dated August 4, 1999. The petition was filed by Respondent in response to the 
Commission's final order dated July 16, 1999. Petitioner filed its response to the Petition for 
Reconsideration on September 9, 1999. Respondent asks the Commission to reconsider part of its Final 
Order in this matter pertaining to the resale exemption, claiming mistake of law or fact. Petitioner objects 
to Respondent's request on the basis that Respondent is merely restating its prior arguments and that the 
Commission already addressed the arguments in its Final Order. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-29 provides that a Petition for Reconsideration "will 
allege as grounds for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new evidence." 
Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for 
Reconsideration. 
DISCUSSION 
This case is sufficiently important to warrant review, and we have done so. Nevertheless, 
Appeal No. 96-2238 
we are not persuaded that our Final Order was in error. We clarify and summarize our findings as follows: 
1. With regard to the vehicles and equipment that were the subject of the KeyCorp 
contracts in evidence before us, we find that ownership transferred from Dick Simon to KeyCorp by terms 
of the contract. 
Respondent continues to argue that titling documents issued on the vehicles are dispositive 
as to ownership of the vehicles. Again we disagree. Titling documents do not create ownership rights, 
they evidence ownership rights. The titling regulations are in place to protect innocent third parties or 
buyers, and they are not controlling as to the transaction here between Dick Simon and KeyCorp. Lake 
Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Jackson v. James. 89 P.2d 
235 (Utah 1939)). Equitable title to a vehicle passes upon a bona fide transfer between the parties and 
without regard to their compliance with titling and registration provisions. See, e.g. Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110 n. 3 and 4 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) and Dahl v. Prince. 230 P.2d 328 
(Utah 1951). We are satisfied that under the terms of the KeyCorp contracts, ownership of the vehicles 
transferred from Dick Simon to KeyCorp. 
Whether Petitioner is in violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act is not a matter 
that is properly before us in this appeal, and we will not address that matter here. However, even if the 
Petitioner is in violation, the violation has no bearing on whether a sales tax exemption applies to these 
transactions. 
2. Where Petitioner, in its ordinary course of business, purchased vehicles and satellite 
equipment with the intention to enter a sale and leaseback agreement, the resale exemption applied. 
- 2 -
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Respondent has referred us to a number of cases on this issue We have reviewed the cases 
and agree that a purchaser claiming the resale exemption must have (1) intended to resell the items Nucor 
Corp v State Tax Comm'n , 832 P 2d 1294 (Utah 1992), and (2) actually resold the items Broadcast Int'l 
v State Tax Comm'n , 882 P 2d 691 (Ut Ct App 1994) Applying those rules to the case at hand, 
Petitioner purchased some vehicles and satellite equipment with the apparent intention of entering a sale 
and leaseback agreement with KeyCorp and, by the terms of their agreement, actually transferred ownership 
of the vehicles and equipment identified to the contracts to KeyCorp 
The KeyCorp contracts in evidence before us indicate that Dick Simon entered a master sale 
and leaseback agreement with KeyCorp, then, from time to time, added equipment schedules as new 
equipment and vehicles were acquired That Dick Simon and KeyCorp structured an open-ended lea >eback 
contract in this manner suggests to us that Dick Simon did indeed purchase certain trucks and equipment 
with the intention that they would be subject to the KeyCorp sale and leaseback agreement As to the 
vehicles and satellite equipment subject to the KeyCorp agreement, we find that the resale provisions are 
satisfied As to the purchases that were subject to secured financing agreements, the resale exemption does 
not apply because there was no transfer of ownership from Dick Simon to the lender Thus, those 
transactions fail to meet the second requirement of the test 
Respondent urges us that Matrix Funding Corp v Auditing Division,1 leads to a different 
conclusion However, as in this case, the Matrix sale transaction was evidenced by the terms of the 
Matrix Funding Corp v Auditing Division, 868 P 2d 832 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
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agreement between the buyer and seller and the sale occurred when the title passed between them. In 
Matrix, the leaseback, as the final transaction in a chain of transactions, was subject to sales tax.2 
Petitioner's leaseback transaction would also be subject to sales tax if were not for the "authorized carrier" 
exemption. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it isthe Commission affirms its Final Order issued July 16,1999. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
DATED this IS day of ^ (ttJiCfaCY 
\ 
_, 1999. 
Rifchard B. McKeoym 
Chairman 
(RECUSED) 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
"{SEAL . \ J ^ 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
cjt^i 6*\ 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
x^A<c, 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
RBMAFV96 2238 fee 
The purpose of the resale exemption is to ensure that the tax liability falls on the final consumer 
Gull Labs, Inc. v Utah State Tax Comm'n , 936 P.2d 1082 (Ut Ct. App. 1997) 
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Exhibit E 
(Tax Commission Rule R865-19-97S (1994)) 
R86S-19-94S Tax Commission Rides 
Ajp» i ( , i if ( 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
CX)DE 1993 
B. The recycling fee is not considered part of the 
sales price of the tire and is not subject to sales or 
use tax. 
C. Wholesalers purchasing tires for resale are not 
subject to the fee. 
D. Tires sold and delivered out of state are not 
subject to the fee. 
E. Tires purchased from out of state vendors are 
subject to the fee. The fee must be reported and 
paid directly to the Tax Commission in conjunction 
with the use tax. 
R865-19-94S. Tips, Gratuities and Cover Charges 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-
103. 
A. Restaurants, cafes, clubs, private clubs, and 
similar businesses must collect sales tax on tips or 
gratuities included on a patron's bill and which are 
required to be paid, unless the total amount of the 
gratuity or tip is passed on to the waiter or waitress 
who served the customer. Tax on the required gra-
tuity is due from private clubs, even though the club 
is not open to the public. Voluntary tips left on the 
table or added to a credit card charge slip are not 
subject to sales tax. 
B. Cover charges to enter a restaurant, tavern, 
club or similar facility are taxable as an admission 
to a place of recreation, amusement or entertain-
ment. 
R865-19-95S. Sid Resort Capital Investment 
Incentive Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 59-12-
120. 
A. Definitions 
1. The "1988-89 ski year" means the ski season 
starting November 1988 continuing through May 
1989. 
2. The "1988-89 ski year sales tax" includes 
state and local sales tax collected from the sale of 
lift tickets but does not include transit tax or resort 
communities tax. Pre-season ticket sales must be 
included. 
B. The ski resort capital investment incentive 
available for each resort shall be calculated as 
follows: 
1. 1988-89 ski year sales tax on lift tickets coll-
ected by each resort divided by 1988-89 ski year 
sales tax on lift tickets collected by all resorts mul-
tiplied by $1,000,000. 
2. The incentive amount available for each resort 
is divided among the resorts as follows, based on 
information provided from the Utah Ski Associa-
tion. 
TABLE 
Alta 
Beaver Mountain 
Brianhead 
Brighton 
Deer Valley 
Elk Meadows 
Nordic Valley 
Park City 
Park West 
Powder Mountain 
Snow Basin 
Snowbird 
Solitude 
Sundance 
Total $1,000,000 
Amount 
Available 
$ 148,394 
13,490 
50,909 
50,937 
145,937 
5,050 
5,285 
263,541 
31,936 
17,000 
26,539 
176,340 
47,084 
17,558 
C. Any person making a request for an incentive 
refund shall submit copies of invoices to substant-
iate the purchase or lease of qualifying equipment, 
including information showing that appropriate 
expenditures have been made. 
D. Any person qualifying for an incentive refund 
shall file a written request with the Tax Commis-
sion, Administration Division, attention Financial 
Manager, on or before June 30,1993. 
E. Any person receiving an incentive refund who 
sells or leases the qualifying resort within four cal-
endar years after receiving an incentive refund shall 
notify the Tax Commission within 30 days of such 
sale or lease. 
R865-19-96S. Transient Room Tax Collection 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 59-12-
103 and 59-12-301. 
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-301 autho-
rizes any board of county commissioners to impose 
a transient room tax. The transient room tax shall 
be charged in addition to sales tax authorized in 59-
12-103(i). 
B. The transient room tax shall be charged on the 
rental price of any motor court, motel, hotel, inn, 
tourist home, campground, mobile home park, 
recreational vehicle park or similar business where 
the rental period is less than 30 consecutive days. 
C. The transient room tax is not subject to sales 
tax. 
R865-19-97S. Sales of Vehicles Used in Interstate \ k [ 
Commerce Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section *7r\ 
59-1-210 and 59-12-104(12). 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Authorized carrier" means: 
a. the holder of a permit or certificate issued by 
the United States Interstate Commerce Commission 
authorizing the holder to engage in interstate com-
merce over highways or other public thoroughfares; 
or 
b. the holder of credentials indicating that the 
vehicle is or will be operated pursuant to the Inter-
national Registration Plan (IRP) and the Internati-
onal Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA). 
B. The purchase of a truck, trailer, tractor, or 
tractor-trailer combination for use in interstate 
commerce by an authorized carrier is exempt from 
sales and use tax. 
C. The seller of the truck, trailer, tractor, or 
tractor-trailer combination is required to maintain 
on file an affidavit from the purchaser certifying 
that the purchaser is an authorized carrier. The 
affidavit must show the purchaser's ICC authoriz-
ation number or the purchaser's IRP and IFTA 
account numbers. 
R865-19-98S. Sales to Nonresidents of Vehicles, 
Off-highway Vehicles, and Boats Required to be 
Registered, and Sales to Nonresidents of Boat 
Trailers and Outboard Motors Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-12-104. 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Person" means any individual, firm, partn-
ership, joint venture, association, corporation, 
estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, or 
any group or combination, acting as a unit. 
2. "Use" means mooring, slipping, and dry 
storage as well as the actual operation of vehicles. 
3. "Vehicle" means a motor vehicle, trailer, 
semitrailer, off-highway vehicle, boat, boat trailer, 
or outboard motor. 
B. In Order t o aual i fv as a nr>nri»«iri<»nt fnr th#» 
R865-19S-96 Tax Commission Rule* 
endar years after receiving an incentive refund shall 
notify the Tax Commission within 30 days of such 
sale or lease. 
R&S5-19S-96. Transient Room Tax Collection 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 59-12-
103*ad59-12-301. 
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-301 autho-
rizes any board of county commissioners to impose 
a transient room tax. The transient room tax shall 
be charged in addition to sales tax authorized in 59. 
12-103(i). 
B. The transient room tax shall be charged on the 
rental price of any motor court, motel, hotel, innt 
tourist home, campground, mobile home park, 
recreational vehicle park or similar business where 
the rental period is less than 30 consecutive days. 
C. The transient room tax is not subject to sales 
tax. 
N/ R865-19S-97. Sales of Vehicles or Aircraft Used 
Yv In Interstate Commerce Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 59-1-210 and 59-12-104(12). 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Authorized carrier" means: 
a) in the case of vehicles: 
(1) the holder of a permit or certificate issued bU 
the United States Interstate Commerce Commission) 
authorizing the holder to engage in interstate com 
mcrce over highways or other public thoroughfares; 
or 
(2) the holder of credentials indicating that the] 
vehicle is or will be operated pursuant to the InterJ 
national Registration Plan (IRP) and the Internatk 
onal Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA); or 
b) in the case of aircraft, the holder of a Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) operating certificate 
or air carrier's operating certificate. 
2. "Vehicle" is as defined in Section 41-la^ 
102. 
B. The purchase of vehicles or aircraft for exclu^ 
sive use in interstate commerce by an authorize^ 
carrier is exempt from sales and use tax. 
C. The requirement of B. that the vehicle or au\ 
craft be used exclusively in interstate commerce doe$ 
not prohibit a de minimis use of that vehicle o\ 
aircraft in Utah. 
D. The seller of the vehicle or aircraft is required 
to maintain on file an affidavit from the purchaser-
certifying that the purchaser is an authorized carrier, 
The affidavit must show the purchaser's operating 
certificate, air carrier's operating certificate, ICC 
authorization number, or IRP and IFTA account 
numbers, as applicable. 
~R865-19S-98. Sales to Nonresidents of Vehicles, 
Off-highway Vehicles, and Boats Required to be 
Registered, and Sales to Nonresidents of Boat 
Trailers and Outboard Motors Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-12-104. 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Person" means any individual, firm, partn-
ership, joint venture, association, corporation, 
estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, or 
any group or combination, acting as a unit. 
2. "Use" means mooring, slipping, and dry 
storage as well as the actual operation of vehicles. 
3. "Vehicle" means a motor vehicle, trailer, 
semitrailer, off-highway vehicle, boat, boat trailer, 
or outboard motor. 
B. In order to qualify as a nonresident for the 
purpose of exempting vehicles from sales tax under 
Subsections 59-12-104(9) and 59-12-104(32), a 
V l O l l i 
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person may not: 
1. be a resident of this state. The fact that a 
person leaves the state temporarily is not sufficient 
to terminate residency; 
2. be engaged in intrastate business and operate 
the purchased vehicle as part of the business within 
this state; 
3. maintain a vehicle with this state designated as 
the home state; 
4. except in the case of a tourist temporarily 
within this state, own, lease, or rent a residence or a 
place of business within this state, or occupy or 
permit to be occupied a Utah residence or place of 
business; 
5. except in the case of an employee who can 
clearly demonstrate that the use of the vehicle in this 
state is to commute to work from another state, be 
engaged in a trade, profession, or occupation or 
accept gainful employment in this state; 
6. allow the purchased vehicle to be kept or used 
by a resident of this state; or 
7. declare residency in Utah to obtain privileges 
not ordinarily extended to nonresidents, such as 
attending school or placing children in school 
without paying nonresident tuition or fees, or mai-
ntaining a Utah driver's license. 
C. A nonresident owner of a vehicle described in 
Section 59-12-104(9) may continue to qualify for 
the exemption provided by that section if use of the 
vehicle in this state is infrequent, occasional, and 
nonbusiness in nature. 
D. A nonresident owner of a vehicle described in 
Section 59-12-104(32) may continue to qualify for 
the exemption provided by that section if use of the 
vehicle in this state does not exceed 14 days in any 
calendar year and is nonbusiness in nature. 
E. Vehicles are deemed not used in this state 
beyond the necessity of transporting them to the 
borders of this state if purchased by: 
1. a nonresident student who will be permanently 
leaving the state within 30 days of the date of pur-
chase; or 
2. a nonresident member of the military stationed 
in Utah, but with orders to leave the state perman-
ently within 30 days of the date of purchase. 
F. Purchasers claiming this exemption must 
complete a nonresident affidavit. False, misleading, 
or incomplete responses shall invalidate the affidavit 
and subject the purchaser to tax, penalties, and 
interest. 
G. A dealer of vehicles who accepts an incomplete 
affidavit, may be held liable for the appropriate tax, 
interest, and penalties. 
H. A dealer of vehicles who accepts an affidavit 
with information that they know or should have 
known is false, misleading or inappropriate may be 
held liable for the appropriate tax, interest, and 
penalties. 
R865-19S-99. Sales and Use Taxes on Vehicles 
Purchased in Another State Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-12-103 and 59-12-
104(26), (28). 
A. No sales or use tax is due on vehicles purch-
ased in another state by a resident of that state and 
transferred into this state if all sales or use taxes 
required by the prior state for the purchase of the 
vehicle have been paid. A valid, nontemporary reg-
istration card shall serve as evidence of such 
payment. 
R865-19S-100. Procedures for Exemption from 
and Refund of Saks and Use Taxes Paid by 
CODE^CO 
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Exhibit F 
Exhibit F 
(House Bill 120 (1995), with Legislative History) 
interpret the proceedings to the hearing-impaired 
person and to interpret the hearing-impaired 
person's testimony If the hearing-impaired 
witness does not understand sign language the 
appointing authority shall take any reasonable, 
necessary steps to ensure that hearing-impaired 
witness may effectively and 8j:c^rate[y_communicate 
in the proceeding 
((5) If Q heaHflgHmpa<red-i>»rson~^-aff^s4^-4of 
an--alleged-vioiatK>ft~o -^^ a-«fHBir>al law( mc4udmg-a 
kxjal-ofdi na*K* H&e -a* r«i t • n g-o£6c*f-i«h aU-pfoeur *-« 
qualified •mfefpf^ «f-fof-afty~*ft4eff-oga*K>nt warwngn 
notificatton-of-fight&r-of-4aifmg of a statemenu-No 
question of-a -law enforcement' officer-or-any-other 
pcffcon hflvinc 31. Dro&ftouiofi^ il '• furvoiton ' in i^nv 
vT+TTTTTTn r—Of—Q w crSt *\J f i H n FVU T *—f^rvvcvCH f l g"* • lOu y -"Oc"" U $ € 0 
&flfliffi£t (KQI ' KC3,Mnc tmoiiiirc^ l por&otv 'Unless ~frttfo&f 
tki fitjttcfnfnt W3.S' rn^ ific or ^elicited through-"-^  
qual+fod- interpreter and- -^as—«*a4e—knowmgly, 
T V t V t t t V f "TV ^tiflVI IMtCltt|$©Tf*tjr w l \mmm l l l""11 |^-*-vit| >c "*• V t 
W » l " v l '•' V?""—flit VI 1^ 1 CICf &<—*,,vltlM?9W™"tfW^iVUI I - ' M l u n W ""iai 
[(6)) (5] If it is the policy and practice of a court 
of this state or of its political subdivisions to 
appoint counsel for indigent people, the appointing 
authority shall appoint and pay for a qualified 
interpreter or other necessary services for hearing-
impaired, indigent people to assist in communication 
with counsel in all phases of the preparation and 
presentation of the case 
((3)1 (6) If a hearing-impaired person is involved 
in administrative, legislative, or judicial proceedings, 
the appointing authority shall recognize that family 
relationship between the particular hearing-
impaired person and an interpreter may constitute a 
possible conflict of interest and select a qualified 
interpreter who will be impartial in the proceedings 
H.B. 120 
Passed 3/1/95, Approved 3/20/95 
Effective 7/1/95 
Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 290 
Sales Tax Authorized Carrier Exemption 
Sponsor John L Valentine 
AN ACT Relating to Revenue and Taxation; 
Providing an Exemption for an Authorized 
Carrier, Providing a Review Date; Making 
Technical Corrections, and Providing an 
Effective Date. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows 
AMENDS. 
59-12-102, as last amended by Chapters 210 226 
and 278, Laws of Utah 1994 
59-12-104. as last amended by Chapters 49. 155 
213, 217, 226. and 248 Laws of Utah 1994 
59-12-104 5, as last amended by Chapter I, La*s 
of Utah 1993, First Special Session 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the Hate of Utah 
Section 1. Section 59-12-102 is amended (o read 
59-12-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Admission or user fees" includes season 
passes 
(b) "Admission or user fees" does not include 
annual membership dues to private organizations 
(2) "Authorized carrier" means 
(a) in the case of vehicles operated over pub 11 c 
highways, the holder of credentials indicating that 
the vehicle is or will be operated pursuant to both 
the International Registration Plan (1RP) and the 
International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA), 
(b) in the case of aircraft, the holder of a Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) operating certificate 
or air carrier's operating certificate, or 
(c) >n the case of locomotives, freight cars, 
railroad work equipment, or other rolling" stock, the 
holder of a certificate issued by the United States 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
(#)] Q} "Commercial consumption" means the 
use connected with trade or commerce and includes 
(a) the use of services or products by retail 
establishments, hotels, motels, restaurants, 
warehouses, and other commercial establishments, 
(b) transportation of property by land, water, or 
air, 
(c) agricultural uses unless specifically exempted 
under this chapter; and 
(d) real property contracting work 
l£)l (4) "Component part" includes 
(a) poultry, dairy, and other livestock feed, and 
their components, 
(b) baling ties and twine used in the baling of hay 
and straw, 
(c) fuel used for providing temperature control of 
orchards and commercial greenhouses doing a 
majority of their business in wholesale sales, and for 
providing power for off-highway type farm 
machinery, and 
(d) feed, seeds, and seedlings 
[(4)1 £5) "Construction materials" means any 
[ tangible personal property that will be converted 
into real property. 
(($)) (£} (a) "Medicine" means 
I (i) insulin, syringes, and any medicine prescribed 
for the treatment of human ailments by a person 
authorized to prescribe treatments and dispensed on 
prescription filled by a registered pharmacist or 
supplied to patients by a physician, surgeon, or 
podiatrist, 
(u) any medicine dispensed to patients in a county 
or other licensed hospital if prescribed for that 
patient and dispensed by a registered pharmacist or 
administered under the direction of a physician and 
(in) any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a 
physician or administered under the direction of a 
physician or paramedic 
(b) "Medicine" does not include 
(i) any auditory, prosthetic, ophthalmic, or ocular 
device or appliance, or 
(ti) any alcoholic beverage* 
!($)] (2) "Person" includes any individual, firm, 
partnership, joint venture, association, corporation, 
estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, this 
state, any county, city, municipality, district, or 
other local governmental entity of the state, or any 
group or combination acting as a unit 
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IW1 (§) "Purchase price" means the amount paid 
or charged for tangible personal property or any 
other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-
12-103(1). excluding only cash discounts taken or 
any excise tax imposed on the purchase price by the 
federal government 
((£)) (p_) "Residential use" means the use in or 
around a home, apartment building, sleeping 
quarters, and similar facilities or accommodations. 
{(9)| (10) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within 
the state of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-
103(1), other than resale of such property, item, or 
service by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or 
consumer 
(b) "Retail sale" includes sales by any farmer or 
other agricultural producer of poultry, eggs, or 
dairy products to consumers if the sales have an 
average monthly sales value of $125 or more. 
((+0)1 (U) (a) "Retailer" means any person 
engaged in a regularly organized retail business in 
tangible personal property or any other taxable item 
or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), and 
who is selling to the user or consumer and not for 
resale. 
(b) "Retailer" includes commission merchants, 
auctioneers, and any person regularly engaged in the 
business of selling to users or consumers within the 
stale 
(c) "Retailer" includes any person who engages 
in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer 
market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, 
periodicals, advertising flyers, or other advertising, 
or by means of print, radio or television media, by 
mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, 
cable, optic, microwave, or other communication 
system 
(d) "Retailer" does not include farmers, 
gardeners, stockmen, poultrymen, or other growers 
or agricultural producers producing and doing 
business on their own premises, except those who 
are regularly engaged in the business of buying or 
selling for a profit 
(e) For purposes of this chapter the commission 
may regard as retailers the following if they 
determine it is necessary for the efficient 
administration of this chapter salesmen, 
representatives, peddlers, or canvassers as the agents 
of the dealers, distributors, supervisors, or 
employers under whom they operate or from whom 
they obtain the tangible personal property sold by 
them, irrespective of whether they are making sales 
on their own behalf or on behalf of these dealers, 
distributors, supervisors, or employers, except that 
(») a printer's facility with which a retailer has 
contracted for printing shall not be considered to be 
a salesman, representative, peddler, canvasser, or 
agent of the retailer, and 
(n) the ownership of property that is located at 
the premises of a printer's facility with which the 
retailer has contracted for printing and that consists 
of the final printed product, property that becomes 
a part of the final printed product, or copy from 
which the printed product is produced, shall not 
result in the retailer being deemed to have or 
maintain an office, distribution house, sales house, 
warehouse, serv\ce enterprise, or other place of 
business, or to maintain a stock of goods, within 
this state 
1(44)1 (j_2) "Sale" means any transfer of title, 
exchange, or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any 
manner, of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-
103(1), for a consideration. It includes 
(a) installment and credit sales, 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale, 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or 
entertainment taxable under this chapter, 
(d) any transaction if the possession of property is 
transferred but the seller retains the title as security 
for the payment of the price, and 
(e) any transaction under which right to 
possession, operation, or use of any article of 
tangible personal property is granted under a lease 
or contract and the transfer of possession would be 
taxable if an outright sale were made 
l(42)J (13) "State" means the state of Utah, us 
departments, and agencies 
[(4£)J (H) "Storage" means any keeping or 
retention of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-
103(1), in this state for any purpose except sale in 
the regular course of business 
1(44)] (15) (a) "Tangible personal property" 
means. 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and 
commodities; 
(ti) all tangible or corporeal things and substances 
which are dealt in or capable of being possessed or 
exchanged; 
(in) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers, 
and 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, 
including property severed from real estate 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not 
include' 
(i) real estate or any interest or improvements in 
real estate, 
(u) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, 
notes, and other evidence of debt, 
(in) insurance certificates or policies, 
(iv) personal or governmental licenses, 
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs, 
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal tender 
of the United States or of a foreign nation, and 
(vu) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, 
medallions, or decorative coins, not constituting 
legal tender of any nation, with a gold, silver, or 
platinum content of not less than 8 0 ^ 
[(44)1 (]6) 00 "Use" means the exercise of any 
right or power over tangible personal property under 
Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the 
ownership or the leasing of that property, item, or 
service 
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display 
demonstration, or trial of that property in the 
regular course of business and held for resale 
l(+6)J {121 "Vehicle" means any aircraft as 
defined in Section 2-1-1, any vehicle, as defined 
in Section 41-U-102, any off-highway vehicle 
as defined in Section 41-22-2, and any vessel, as 
defined in Section 41-U-102, that is required to 
be titled, registered, or both "Vehicle" for 
purposes of Subsection 59-12-104(37") only, "also 
includes any locomotive, freight car, railroad work 
equipment, or other railroad rolling stock 
Ki3)l (18) "Vehicle dealer" means a person 
engaged in the business of buying, selling, or 
exchanging vehicles as defined m Subsection ((44)) 
112 
1(4*)] (19} (a)" Vendor" means 
0) any person receiving any payment or 
consideration upon a sale of tangible personal 
property or any other taxable item or service under 
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Subsection 59-12-103(1), or to whom such 
payment or consideration is payable, and 
(u) anv person who engages , n regJar or j 
systematic solicitation of a consumer market in this 
state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, 
advertising flyers, or other advertising, or by means 
of prim, radio or television media, by mail, 
telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, cable, 
optic, microwave, or other communication system 
(b) "Vendor" docs not mean a printer's facility 
described in Subsection [(+0)) (ll)(e) 
Section 2. Section 59-12-104 is amended to read ' 
59-12-104. Exemptions 
The fouwwing saics ana uses are exempt trom the 
taxes imposed by this chapter 
(1) sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special 
fuel subject to a Utah state excise tax under Title 
59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax Act, 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its 
political subdivisions, except sales of construction 
material* however, construction materials purchased 
by the state, its institutions, or its political 
subdivisions which are installed or converted to real 
property by employees of the state, its institutions, 
or its political subdivisions are exempt, 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products 
from vending machines in which the proceeds of 
each saJe do not exceed 51 if the vendor or operator 
of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 
150°7« of the cost of items as goods consumed, 
(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar 
confections, and related services to commercial 
airline carriers for in-flight consumption 
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in 
aircraft operated by common carriers in interstate or 
foreign commerce, 
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, 
prerecorded audio program tapes or records, and 
prerecorded video tapes by a producer, distributor, 
or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, 
or commercial television or radio broadcaster, 
(7) sales made through com operated laundry 
machines that are 
(a) located in multiple dwelling units, 
(b) used exclusively for the benefit of tenants, and 
(c) not available for use by the general public, 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable 
institutions in the conduct of their regular religious 
or charitable functions and activities, if the 
requirements of Section 59-12-104 1 arc fulfilled, 
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be 
registered under the motor vehicle laws of this state 
which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this 
state and are not afterwards registered or used in 
this state except as necessary to transport them to 
the borders of this state, 
(10) sales of medicine 
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services 
used in the construction of or incorporated in 
pollution control facilities allowed by Sections 19-
2-123 through 19-2-127 
(12) sales or use of property which the state is 
prohibited from taxing under the Constitution or 
laws of the United States or under the laws of this 
state, 
(13) sales of meals served by 
(a) public elementary and secondary schools, 
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and 
institutions of higher education, if the meals are not 
available to the general public, and 
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing 
facilities, 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not 
regular!/ engaged »n bu»ine»», c Ate pi mc saie of 
vehicles or vessels required to be titled or registered 
under the laws of this state, 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment 
purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use in 
new or expanding operations (excluding normal 
operating replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they may 
increase plant production or capacity, as determined 
by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in 
UtahUJ 
(a) manufacturing facility means an establishment 
described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 1987 
Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of the 
federal Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget, 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, the 
commission shall by rule define "new or expanding 
operations" and "establishment", 
(c) by October 1, 1991, and every five years 
thereafter, the commission shall review this 
exemption and make recommendations to the 
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee 
concerning whether the exemption should be 
continued, modified, or repealed In its report to the 
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee, the tax 
commission review shall include at least 
(i) the cost of the exemption, 
(it) the purpose and effectiveness of the 
exemption, and 
(in) the benefits of the exemption to the state, 
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support 
equipment, and special test equipment used or 
consumed exclusively in the performance of any 
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the 
United States government or any subcontract under 
that contract, but only if, under the terms of that 
contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and 
equipment is vested in the United States government 
as evidenced by a government identification tag 
I placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on 
a government-approved property record if a tag is 
impractical, 
(17) intrastate movements of freight by common 
carriers, 
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper 
subscriptions, 
(19) tangible personal property, other than 
money, traded in as full or part payment of the 
purchase price, except that for purposes of 
calculating sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by 
a vehicle dealer, trade ins are limited to other 
vehicles only, and the tax is based upon the then 
existing fair market value of the vehicle being sold 
and the vehicle being traded in, as determined by 
the commission, 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control 
insects, diseases, and weeds for commercial 
production ot fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and 
animal products, 
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or 
consumed primarily and directly in farming 
I operations, including sales of irrigation equipment 
and supplies used for agricultural production 
T r p""s »-;•*•;- ~- -w% % j-v / bcwoiue pan of real 
estate and whether or not installed by farmer, 
contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of 
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies 
used in a manner that is incidental to farming, such 
as hand tools with a unit purchase price not in 
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excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial 
equipment and supplies, 
(b) tangible personal property used
 tn any 
activities other than farming, such as office 
equipment and supplies, equipment and supplies 
used in sales or distribution of farm products, in 
research, or in transportation; or 
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the 
laws of this state, without regard to the use to which 
the vehicle is put, 
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or 
garden, farm, or other agricultural produce if sold 
by the producer, 
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps, 
(24) sales of nonreturnable containers, 
nonreturnablc labels, nonreturnable bags, 
nonreturnable shipping cases, and nonreturnable 
casings to a manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or 
retailer for use in packaging tangible personal 
property to be sold by that manufacturer, processor, 
wholesaler, or retailer, 
(25) property stored in the state for resale, 
(26) property brought into the state by a 
nonresident for his or her own personal use or 
enjoyment while within the state, except property 
purchased for use in Utah by a nonresident living 
and working in Utah at the time of purchase, 
(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in 
the regular course of business, either in its original 
form or as an ingredient or component part of a 
manufactured or compounded product; 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was 
paid to some other state, or one of its subdivisions, 
except that the state shall be paid any difference 
between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this 
part and Part 2, and no adjustment is allowed if the 
tax paid was greater than the tax imposed by this 
part and Part 2, 
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 
59-12-103(l)(b), (c), and (d) to a person for use 
in compounding a service taxable under the 
subsections, 
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC 
program of the United States Department of 
Agriculture, 
(31) sales or leases made before June 30, 1996, of 
rolls, rollers, refractory brick, electric motors, and 
other replacement parts used in the furnaces, mills, 
and ovens of a steel mill described in SIC Code 3312 
of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual, of the federal Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Management and Budget, 
(32) sales of boats of a type required to be 
registered under Title 73, Chapter 18, State Boating 
Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which are 
made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are 
not thereafter registered or used in this state except 
as necessary to transport them to the borders of this 
state, 
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons 
within this state that is subsequently shipped outside 
the state and incorporated pursuant to contract into 
and becomes a part of real property located outside 
of this state, except to the extent that the other state 
or political entity imposes a sales, use, gross 
receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it 
against which the other state or political e". */ 
allows a credit for taxes imposed by this chapter, 
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold 
for delivery and use outside Utah where a sales or 
use tax is not imposed, even tf the title is passed in 
Utah; 
(35) until July 1, 1999, amounts paid for purchase 
of telephone service for purposes of providing 
telephone service,[-and] 
(36) fares charged to persons transported directly 
by a public transit district created under the 
authority of Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 10M, and 
(37) sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of 
vehicles by an authorized carrier 
Section ,1, Section 59-12-104.5 Is amended to 
read: 
59-12-104.5. Review of sales tax exemptions. 
(1) The Tax Review Commission, in cooperation 
with the Governor's Office and the State Tax 
Commission, shall conduct a review of tne following 
sales tax exemptions and related issues created in 
Section 59-12-104 within the following period of 
time 
(a) Subsections 59-12-104(3), (6), (7), (11), (15), 
(17), (24), [afKi] (31), and (37) before October 1, 
1993, and every eight years thereafter, 
(b) Subsections 59-12 104(4), (5), (16), (18), 
(20), (21), (22), (34), and (35) before October I, 
1994, and every eight years thereafter 
(c) Subsections 59-12-104(1), (2), (8), (12), (13), 
(23), (29), and (30) before October 1, 1995, and 
every eight years thereafter, and 
(d) Subsections 59-12-104(9), (10), (14), (19), 
(25), (26), (27), (28), (32), and (33) before October 
1, 1996, and every eight years thereafter 
(2) (a) The Tax Review Commission and the 
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee shall 
make recommendations to the governor and the 
Legislature, on or before the October interim 
meeting in the year the study is required to be 
completed under this section, concerning whether 
the exemption listed in Subsection (1) should be 
continued, modified, or repealed 
(b) In its report to the governor and the Revenue 
and Taxation Interim Committee, the commission 
review shall include at least 
(i) the cost of the exemption, 
(u) the following criteria for granting or extending 
incentives for businesses 
(A) the business must be willing to make a 
substantial capital investment in Utah, signaling that 
it will be a long-term member of the community, 
(B) the business must bring new dollars into the 
state, which generally means the business must 
export goods or services outside of Utah not just 
recirculate existing dollars, 
(C) the business must pay higher than average 
wages in the area where it will be located, increasing 
Utah's overall household income (average wage 
calculations are not to include local, state, or federal 
government or school district employees), 
(D) the same incentives offered the outside 
business must be available to existing in-state 
businesses so as not to discriminate against home-
grown businesses, and 
(E) the incentives must clearly produce a positive 
return on investment as determined by state 
economic modeling formulas, 
(m) the Legislature's sales and use tax policy 
positions adopted in H J R 32 of the 1990 General 
Session, 
(w\ the ourpose and effectiveness of the 
exemption, and 
(v) the benefits of the exemption to the state 
(3) Item 43, in H B 337, enacted during the 1993 
General Session, is transferred from the Tax 
Commission to the Tax Review Commission to 
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implement this section 
Section 4, Effective date 
This act takes effect on July 1, 1995 
H.B. 121 
Passed 2/20/95, Approved 3/10/95 
Effective 7/1/95 
Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 119 
Prudent Investor Rule 
Sponsor Fred R Hunsaker 
AN ACT Relating to Uniform Probate Code; 
Modifying the Trustee's or Conservator's 
Standard of Care and Performance; Making 
Technical Corrections, and Providing an 
Effective Date. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows 
AMENDS 
75-5-417, as last amended by Chapter 290, Laws 
of Utah 1992 
75-7-202, as enacted by Chapter 150, Laws of 
Utah 1975 
75-7-403, as last amended by Chapter I, Laws of 
Utah 1986 
REPEALS AND KLLNACIS 
75-7-302, as enacted by Chapter 150, Laws of 
Utah 1975 
Be // enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah. 
Section 1. Section 75-5-417 is amended to read 
75-5-417 General duty of conservator, 
(1) A conservator shall act as a fiduciary and shall 
observe the standards of care (that—wou44—be 
observed—by—a—prudent—man—dealing—wnh—the 
property of another, and if-he has special'skills or-is 
special skills or expertise he is under a duty to use 
those skills) as set forth in Section 75-7-302 
(2) The conservator shall, for all estates in excess 
of $50,000, excluding the residence owned by the 
ward, send a report with a full accounting to the 
court on an annual basis For estates less than 
$50,000, excluding the residence owned by the ward, 
the conservator shall fill out an informal annual 
report and mail the report to the court The report 
shall include the following a statement of assets at 
the beginning and end of the reporting year, income 
received during the year disbursements for the 
support of the ward and other expenses incurred by 
the estate The court may require additional 
information The forms for both the informal report 
for estates under $50 000, excluding the residence 
owned by the ward and the full accounting report 
for larger estates shall be approved by the judicial 
council This annual report shall be examined and 
approved by the court 
(3) Corporate fiduciaries arc not required to full> 
petition the court but shall submit their internal 
report annually to the court The report shall be 
examined and approved by the court 
(4) If a conservator or corporate fiduciary (a) 
makes a substantial misstatement on filings of any 
required annual reports, (b) is guilty of gross 
impropriety in handling the property of the ward, or 
(c) willfully fails to file the report required by this 
section, after receiving written notice of the failure 
to file and after a grace period of two months have 
elapsed, then the court may impose a fine tn an 
amount not to exceed $5,000 The court may also 
order restitution of funds misappropriated from the 
estate of a ward The penalty shall be paid by the 
conservator or corporate fiduciary and may not be 
paid by the estate 
(5) These provisions and penalties governing 
annua! reports do not apply if the conservator is the 
parent of the ward. 
Section 2. Section 75-7-202 is amended to read: 
75-7*202 Effect of administration in this state • 
Consent to jurisdiction. 
(1) By accepting the trusteeship of a trust of 
which the principal place of administration is in this 
state, or by moving the principal place of 
administration of a trust to this state, the trustee 
submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state in any proceeding under Section 75-
7 201 as to any matter relating to the trust arising 
while the principal place of administration is located 
in this state 
(2) To the extent of the beneficial interests in a 
trust of which the principal place of administration 
is in this state, the beneficiaries of the trust are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the coum of this state 
for purposes of proceedings under Section 75-7-
201 
(3) Unless otherwise designated in the trust 
instrument, the principal place of administration of 
a trust is the trustee's usual place of business where 
the records pertaining to the trust are kept or at the 
trustee's residence if (he) the trustee has no such 
place of business In the case of co-trustees, the 
principal place of administration, if not otherwise 
designated in the trust instrument, is 
(a) the usual place of business of the corporate 
trustee if there is but one corporate co-trustee, 
(b) the usual place of business or residence of the 
individual trustee who is a professional fiduciary if 
there is (bm) one [such person) individual trustee 
and no corporate co-trustee, or 
(c) The usual place of business or residence of any 
of the co-trustees as agreed upon by them 
(4) By accepting the delegation of a trust function 
from the trustee of a trust of which the principal 
place of administration is in this state, the agem 
submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state 
for purposes of proceedings under Section 75-7-
201_ 
Section 3 Section 75-7-302 Is repealed and 
reenacted to read: 
75-7-302. Trustee's standard of care and 
performance. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 
(2), a trustee who invests and manages trus£_asscfs 
owes a duty to the beneficiaries" of the trust to 
comply uith the prudent investor rulc'as set Jbrthjn 
ihi> section If a trustee is named "on the basis" o_f a 
trusteed" representations of speciaf'skills" or 
expertise ,^jhe trustee has a duty to use thosc_ sgecial 
skills or expertise 
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(2) The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may 
be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise 
altered by the provisions of a trust. A Trustee is not 
liable to a beneficiary to the extent that the trustee 
acted in reasonable reliance on the provisions of the 
trust 
(3) A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets 
as a prudent investor wouId,_T>y "consider]n£_the 
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, "and 
other circumstances of the trust In satisfying this 
standard, the trustee shall exercise "reasonable care, 
skill, and caution 
(4) A trustee's investment and management 
decisions respecting individual assets must be 
evaluated not in isolation but jn_ the context of the 
trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an ovcralI 
investment strategy having risk and return objectives 
reasonably suited to the trust Among circumstances 
that the trustee shall consider m_ investing and 
managing trust assets are such o f The following as 
are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries 
(a) general economic conditions, 
(b) the possible effect of inflation or deflation, 
(c) the expected tax consequences of investment 
decisions or strategies, 
(d) the role that each investment _o_r_ course of 
action plays within the overall "trust portfolio, which 
may include financial assets, interests m closely held 
enterprises, tangible and intangible personal 
property, and real property, "" 
(e) the expected total return from income and the 
appreciation of capital, 
(Q other resources of the beneficiaries, 
(g) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, jind 
preservation or appreciation of capital, 
(h) the duty to incur only reasonable and 
appropriate investment costs, and 
0) an asset's special relationship or special value, 
if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or 
more of the beneficiaries. 
(5) A trustee shall make a reasonable effort to 
verify facts relevant to the investment and 
management of trust assets 
(6) A trustee may invest in any kind of property 
or type of investment consistent with the standards 
of this section 
(7) A trustee shall diversify the investments of the 
trust unless, the trustee reasonably determines that, 
because of special circumstances, the purposes of 
the trust are better served without diversifying 
(8) (a) A trustee shall invest and manage the trust 
assets solely in the interest of the beneficiaries 
(b) If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the 
trustee shall act impartially u\ investing and 
managing the trust assets, taking into account any 
differing interests of the beneficiaries 
(9) This section does not require a specific 
outcome in investing, and compliance with the 
prudent investor rule i f determined in light of the 
facts and circumstances existing at The time of a 
trustee's decision or action and not by hindsight 
(10) Within a reasonable Time "after accepting a 
trusteeship or receiving trust assets, a trustee shall 
review the trust assets and make and implement 
decisions concerning the retention and disposition of 
assets, in order to bring the trust port folio into 
compliance with the purposes^ terms, distribu11on 
r
^J£5mJ*Elsi. and other circumstances jaf Jhe Trust, 
and with the* requirements of this section 
(11) (a) A trustee may delegate investment and 
management functions that a prudent trustee of 
comparable skills could properly delegate under the 
circumstances The trustee shall exercise reasonable 
care, skill, and caution in, 
(i) selecting the agent, 
(n) establishing the scope and terms of the 
delegation consistent with the purposes of the trust, 
and 
(m) periodically reviewing the agent's actions to 
monitor the agent's performance and compliance 
with the terms of the delegation 
(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent 
has a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to 
comply with the terms of the delegation 
(c) A trustee who complies with the requirements 
of Subsection (ll)(a) is not liable to the beneficiaries 
or to the trust for the decisions or actions of the 
agent to whom the function was delegated. 
(12) The following terms or comparable language 
in the provisions of a trust, unless otherwise limited 
or modified, authorizes any investment or strategy 
permitted under this section "investments 
permissible by law for investment of trust fundsT7 
legal investments/ "authorized investments/" 
"using the judgment and care under the 
circumstances then prevailing that persons of 
prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the 
management of their own affairs, not in regard to 
the speculation but in regard to the permanent 
disposition of their funds, considering the probable 
income as well as the probable safety of their 
capital," "prudent man rule," "prudent trustee 
rule," "prudent person rule," and prudent 
investor rule " 
(13) This section applies to trusts existing on and 
created after July 1, 1995 As applied to trusts 
existing on July 1, 1995, this section governs only 
decisions or actions occurring after July 1, 1995 
Section 4. Section 75-7-403 Is amended to read: 
75-7-403. Trustee's office not transferable -
Transactions. 
(1) The trustee shall not transfer his office to 
another or delegate the entire administration of the 
trust to a co-trustee or another 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any 
transaction permitted under Section 7-5-14 or 
Subsection 7S-7-302O1) 
Section 5. Effective date. 
This act takes effect on July 1, 1995 
H.B. 124 
Passed 3/1/95, Approved 3/15/95 
Effective 7/1/95 
Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 197 
Retirement Law Amendments 
Sponsor Beverly Ann Evans, John B Arnngton 
AN ACT Relating to Pensions; Revising the 
Powers and Duties of the State Retirement 
Board; Granting the Board Rulemaking 
Authority Under Certain Circumstances; 
Revising the Purchase Requirements for 
Various Benefits; Modifying the Calculation 
of Benefits Under Certain Circumstances; 
Revising the Provisions Relating to 
Reemployment of a Retired Member of a 
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Mark K. Buchi #0475 
Steven P. Young #7681 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DICK SIMON TRUCKING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN P. YOUNG 
Civil No. 990404442 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Steven P. Young, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney at the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP. 
2. I am over the age of 21 and I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth 
herein. If called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to the truthfulness of such 
matters. 
#86870 vl 
3. I hereby attest that I listened to the audio recording of the legislative history of 
Utah House Bill 120 (1995) at the House and Senate offices at the Utah State Capital Building, 
and that the attached record is a true and correct version of such audio recording. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this l£S_ day of June, 2000 
" """Notary Public""" I 
DEBRA BOWMAN , 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 , 
My Commission Expires | 
January 18,2003 
-
 —
^ t e p f U t a h ^ _J 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
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Legislative History of H.B, 120 (1995), 
Sales Tax Authorized Carrier Exemption 
Statement on the House Floor by Representative John Valentine (sponsor), Feb. 2L 1995 
House Bill 120, authorized carrier exemption, gives an interesting problem that we've had occur 
in the state. If you buy a railroad car, or an airplane if you're Delta Airlines, or if you buy a 
tractor trailer or a tractor rig, you buy it out of state, and you take your first trip to someplace else 
other than Utah, and then you bring it into Utah, and you use it in Utah all the whole rest of the 
useful life of that particular item. 
Now why do you do that? It's because you pay big bucks to a tax attorney like me, who reads the 
tax law and says, hmmm, if you buy it in the state of Utah, your going to pay sales tax on it. So 
nobody does it. Instead, you have somebody like me who figures it out for you, and you do that 
little route that I just told you about, and therefore you don't pay sales tax on it. We have virtual 
noncompliance in this area. 
House Bill 120 was therefore developed as a compromise between the State Tax Commission 
and the transportation industry. It took us a year to put it together. I've sat in a lot of meetings 
down at the State Tax Commission office trying to listen to all the different sides trying to come 
up with a way to solve this problem. 
What does the bill do? It basically says this: If you are a carrier who operates under an IRP (an 
International Registration Plan) and an International Fuel Tax Agreement (an IFTA certificate), 
then if you purchase it, it is not subject to sales tax. 
Now why did I make that policy call? That is the best definition that I could come up with in this 
industry to identify those who are truly engaged in interstate commerce. If they're truly engaged 
in interstate commerce, the U.S. Constitution says we can't tax them anyway. Therefore, the best 
that I could come up with to solve the mechanical problem was to solve it by using those two 
criteria as the test of whether or not you are engaged in interstate commerce for a tractor trailer 
rig. Similarly, I did the same thing for airlines, and the bill does the same thing for railroads. 
It is my impression that we lose sales out of the state of Utah to out-of-state vendors, Colorado 
and Wyoming primarily, due to the fact that we have an oddball situation in this area. If we 
brought these sales into Utah, we would end up with sales that meet the content of the interstate 
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, but we would have the sales occurring here in the 
state of Utah and derive the income from it. 
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Statements from the Senate Transportation and Public Safety Committee, February 23,1995 
Representative Valentine 
We have a difficult problem in the state of Utah with the purchases of large tractor trailer rigs, 
the purchase of train cars, and the purchase of large airplanes. The problem is this: People pay a 
lot of money to people like me to figure out nifty ways to get around the tax law, because if you 
go buy your truck in Colorado, and you take your first load to Wyoming, and the rest of the time 
you use it in the state of Utah, Utah does not collect sales tax for the most part on the sales of 
those kind of items because, the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits us 
from doing it if it's in interstate commerce. 
If you don't hire someone like me, or you have an accountant who doesn't know what they doing, 
what they do is they go buy a truck from a dealer here and they pay sales tax on it at that point in 
time, and you've got a problem because you've paid the sales tax on a very large item, such as an 
airplane or a railroad car. Nobody does it. In fact, the fiscal note that's on the bill was obtained 
in such a way that is was just a best guess that somebody must not be complying with it by using 
this circular route that I have just identified. 
What this bill does is says enough's enough. We don't have to do the circular route anymore. 
We should not have those people paying sales tax because nobody's paying sales tax in this area. 
I had to spend a lot of time this summer [at] a transportation summit as it were between the State 
Tax Commission and the transportation industry. We had a lot of support after we broke the 
summit. We used two formulas here to determine whether a carrier is in interstate commerce. 
The two formulas are if they are both an IRP and an IFTA registered carrier, then they are in 
interstate commerce. 
[Question from the audience]: How would this affect airplanes? 
[Valentine]: It would affect airplanes as well. That's on the next page. It's an FAA certificate ~ 
so if they're an FAA carrier . . . . [inaudible.] Locomotive cars are on page 5. 
Unknown Senator 
I'll give you a good example, with . . . [inaudible] Pacific. They have a terminal here. When 
they buy new equipment,.. . [inaudible]. If you put it in service there,. . . [inaudible], but if you 
put it in the terminal here, then it would have to be sales taxable . . . [inaudible]. And I talked to 
the Tax Commission today, and they say that they're in agreement, and have worked this o u t . . . 
[inaudible]. They're not going to try to force something that's not enforceable. 
Statement on the Senate Floor by Senator Lyle Hillyard, Feb. 28, 1995 
It was originally on the consent calendar. It was taken off because of the fiscal note. It's a 
simple bill, and what it is is if you buy and operate equipment in interstate commerce, then there 
is no sales tax, and so where they buy them is outside of the state of Utah. 
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Now theyVe had a real struggle on how to determine that, so theyVe got the definition on page 1, 
and that's if you have an EFT A, you can tell me if that's right, on public highways, or an FAA 
approved aircraft of locomotives that are approved on that basis, and if you have that then the 
equipment you buy, itfs in compliance with federal law, and it's really a struggle between those 
companies and the State Tax Commission. They've agreed to that definition of language to put 
in the statute, exempting it from sales tax. 
[Question from a Senator]: What is the fiscal note? 
[Hillyard]: It says $150,000, and the people who brought the bill to me tell me that theyVe gone 
to the sellers of these items. They say we never pay any sales tax because we never buy them in 
the state of Utah. They don't know where the $150,000 came from but it will be tabled on the 
3rd. 
It does appear on the House priority list, so at this point there does appear to be funding for it. 
Statement on Senate Floor by Senator Lvle Hillyard, March 1, 1995 
There is a special tax exemption under federal law for carriers. The definition has always been, 
what are the carriers and how do you do that? This puts in code an agreement by the State Tax 
Commission and the people involved, ending a 40-year war. 
You'll notice it has a small fiscal note. We don't think it should have any because now those 
pieces of equipment will be purchased in the state of Utah. It's funded and taken care of. 
#50450 3 
Exhibit G 
Exhibit G 
(Tax Commission Advisory Opinions on Ski Lifts) 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
210 North 1950 West Sale Lake City, Utah 84134 
W. Val Ovcsoo, Chairman 
Para Hendrickson, Commissioner 
Richard B. McKcown, Commissioner 
Joe B. Pachcco, Commissioner 
Rodney G. MarrelU, Executive Director 
February 3, 1998 
Mark K. Buchi 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
111 EBroadway Ste 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5233 
Advisory Opinion - Sales Tax Exemption - Ski Tramways 
Dear Mr. Buchi, 
We have received your request for sales tax guidance pertaining to the sales tax 
exemption that applies to purchases by ski resorts of ski tramways. Although, as we explain 
below, we do not wholly agree with your reasoning, we do agree that for purposes of determining 
whether sales of ski tramways are exempt under Utah Code section 59-12-104, the tramway itself 
must be treated as tangible personal property. 
We cannot agree with you that ski tramways are "clearly" personal property. From the 
manner in which tramway towers and foundations are affixed, one could easily argue that a 
tramway is, in whole or in part, converted to real property upon installation. Nothing in the 
legislative history of this exemption or in the Barrett case pursuades us otherwise. 
As to the Barrett case, nothing in that opinion addresses whether ski tramways remain 
tangible personal property once installed. Barrett merely states that repair parts delivered from 
out of state are tangible personal property and are subject to use tax. The court did not consider 
whether the parts would be converted to real property upon installation. 
Regarding the legislative history of this exemption, we are aware that the legislative 
committee that studied the exemption considered whether to extend the exemption to contractors 
who install tramways "on behalf of' a ski resort. As you know, the legislature included "on 
behalf of * language in Utah Code section 59-12-104 (3) (a) to allow contractors to purchase 
construction materials tax free if the the materials are installed or converted to real property that 
is owned by a public school. When similar language was introduced as part of the tramway 
exemption, the language was considered to be potentially problematic, so it is was omitted. 
Because the "on behalf of' language was deliberately dropped from the tramway exemption, we 
conclude that the legislature intended the tax consequences to fall on the real property contractor 
when items are converted to real property. 
if you need an accommodation under the American *s with Disabilities Act contact the Tax Commission at (SOJ) 297-3SU or 
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD) (SOI) 297-3S19. Please allow three working days for a response. 
Michad O. Uavilt 
Govcmof 
Oknc S. Walker 
Licu(coan< Governor 
From an administrative point of view, the legislative history creates a dilemma. By the 
plain language of the statute, the exemption applies only if the tramway is sold as tangible 
personal property directly to the ski resort. Ski resorts typically contract to purchase tramways 
completely installed. If, by the nature of the installation, the tramway is deemed to be conveited 
to real property upon installation, the installer would be liable for the sales tax on the materials 
installed. There would never be a sale of tangible personal property to the ski resort, and the 
exemption would have no effect. 
We are primarily concerned with our obligation to give effect to the legislature's intent. It 
is apparent that the legislature intended the real property contractor to pay sales or use tax on ihe 
items that he converts to real property. On the other hand, we cannot construe the statute in a 
way that would render the exemption entirely inoperative. On that basis, we have concluded that, 
at minimum, the cement foundations which underly the tramway are converted to real property 
upon installation. The cement foundations that support the tramway are intended to be 
permanent installations over their useful life. Even if the tramway itself is moved, the 
foundations cannot be removed in tact without harm and reused in other locations. See, 
Nickerson Pump and Machinery Co. v. State Tax Commission, 361 P.2d 520 (Utah 1961). We 
also conclude that lift houses or other structures that have the characteristics of permanent 
buildings are treated as real property upon installation. 
As to the tramway itself, the tramway and all of its essential parts or accessories are 
considered tangible personal property, even upon installation. Unlike the cement foundations, 
the tramway, including the tramway towers, can be relocated or realigned as needed. Any item 
that is an integral accessory to the tramway will be treated as tangible personal property for 
purposes of the sale of the tramway under Utah Administrative Rule R865-19S-58, including any 
lift houses or structures that can be moved and that do not have the characteristics of permanent 
buildings. 
While the sale of the tramway system is deemed a sale of tangible personal property for 
purposes of R865-19S-58, it may or may not be treated as tangible personal property after 
installation. Your clients will be interested to know that for purposes of charges for repairs under 
Utah Administrative Rule R865-19S-78, a tramway may be considered real property if it meets 
the guidelines set out in subsection (B) (2) of that rule. This distinction may work to your 
clients' advantage because labor to repair real property is nontaxable. 
Please let us know if you have other questions. 
For the Commission, 
-Joe B. Pacheco, 
Commissioner 
JBP/IR 
97-081 
April 24, 1997 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY STATE ZIP 
Advisory Opinion - Ski Resort sales tax exemption on passenger tramways 
DearXXXXX, 
We have received your request for tax guidance concerning the sales tax exemption for 
passenger tramways install at ski resorts. We offer the following: 
The sale to a ski resort of a passenger tramway, as defined by section 63-11-38 of the 
Utah Code, is exempt from sales tax. "Passenger tramway'' means two-car or multicar aerial 
passenger tramway; chair lift, J-bar, T-bar, or platter pull and rope tow. 
Passenger tramways operate in conjunction with towers secured in or to concrete 
foundations. The question of whether the concrete foundations become real property upon 
installation is important because the contractor who sells and converts an item of personal 
property to real property is regarded as the final consumer of the personal property. Utah Admin. 
Rule R865-19S-58. As the final consumer of the item, the contractor is liable for the sales tax on 
his purchase of that item. The contractor's customer has no tax liability because the customer is 
buying real property, which is not subject to sales tax. 
The legislature has authorized contractors to purchase construction materials tax free only 
in a limited circumstance. If the contractor purchases the materials on behalf of a public school 
and converts those materials to real property owned by the school, the contractor need not pay 
sales tax on the purchase of those materials. The legislature has not enacted an equivalent 
exception for contractors installing ski resort improvements. Therefore, if your company 
purchases construction materials on behalf of the ski resort and converts them to real property, 
your company is liable for the tax. Likewise, if your company purchases the items tax free for 
resale, then sells and installs any of the items so as to convert them to real property, your 
company will be liable for the tax on those items. To avoid this outcome, the ski resort should 
purchase the cement directly from the cement company or supplier, and not from your company. 
The cement purchases will be exempt if: 
1. the ski resort makes payment for the materials directly to the vendor; and 
2. establishes that materials purchased were used to construct a qualifying passenger 
tramway. 
When the auditors raised this issue with you, they may have questioned whether the 
cement foundations are part of the tramway within the meaning of this exemption. We conclude 
that the foundations which secure the tramway are an integral part of and appurtenant to the 
tramway. Therefore, if the cement used to build the tramway foundations is purchased directly 
by the ski resort, the exemption applies. 
Please let us know if you have other questions. 
For the Commission, 
Joe B. Pacheco, 
Commissioner 
